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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has become big business with organizations spending millions of
dollars creating and deploying cloud solutions. However, adoption of this multi-tenant and
dynamic technology has been slowed by security concerns. In this dissertation, to help
increase adoption by reducing security risks, we examine three research questions. First, how
can we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without specific knowledge of tenant
applications? Second, how can we assist cloud providers with interpretation of the alert
output from security controls in an IaaS cloud environment to improve security? And, third,
how can we help protect cloud tenants from insider data theft attacks?
To answer these questions, we utilize the design science research methodology to
accomplish the objective of creating and demonstrating a new system composed of novel
security controls addressing each research question. We posit a system comprised of three
security control artifacts to assist cloud providers with improving their overall security
posture. Our proposed system consists of three components: A Hypervisor-based Cloud
Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), a Streaming Cloud Intrusion Monitoring and
Classification System (SCIMCS), and a system for detecting insider attacks within cloud
computing environments.
First, HCIDS utilizes data from hypervisors running on cloud controller nodes to
detect and classify abnormal usage. Instantiation and demonstration of the system reveals a
100 percent detection rate for denial of service attacks from and against virtual machines.
Second, SCIMCS addresses the problem of information overload from alerts generated by
security controls in dynamic multi-tenant cloud environments. Implementation and
evaluation of this approach divulges an average message reduction rate of 95.9 percent based
on our experimentation. Third, the system for detecting insider data theft examines node
system state and anomalies in network bytes transmitted as well as number of active user
counts to detect virtual machine and data store theft. This approach demonstrates a 100
percent detection rate for data theft and unapproved logins on cloud nodes.
Each of these components plays a unique role in improving the overall security
posture in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud Computing Environments. The
combination of each approach makes up an overall system that addresses intrusion detection
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while preserving privacy, information overload from a plethora of controls deployed in a
defense in depth strategy, and the concern of insider data theft. Furthermore, each component
is designed, instantiated, demonstrated and communicated at respected conferences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 2006, Amazon EC2, one of the leading Infrastructure as a Service
cloud providers, went into beta (Barr, 2006). Since then, cloud computing has become big
business with organizations spending millions of dollars creating cloud solutions. The largest
technology companies in the world now provide cloud computing offerings and solutions
(Google, 2015; IBM, 2015; Microsoft, 2015). However, cloud computing is not without its
challenges. More specifically, since the inception of cloud computing, security and privacy
have been an ongoing concern that has slowed adoption of the technology (Kandukuri, Paturi,
& Rakshit, 2009; Lori, 2010; Ren, Wang, & Wang, 2012; Takabi, Joshi, & Ahn, 2010). In
chapter one, we explore the background of our research problem, provide a concise problem
statement, and define the objectives of this dissertation project.

Background of the Problem
In 2014, IDG Enterprise reported the results of a survey on cloud computing which
revealed that 45 percent of respondents had cloud projects return to internal information
technology teams. Furthermore, 59 percent of the respondents who indicated projects were
brought back in house stated security concerns were a contributing factor (IDG, 2014). The
number of cloud providers and organizations considering cloud computing as a paradigm for
deploying information technology solutions combined with the continuing concern over
security makes cloud computing security an interesting and worthwhile research topic to
explore.
In order to comprehend the importance of this problem, one first must have an
understanding of cloud computing. Cloud computing can be defined as a model for enabling
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction (Armbrust et al.,
2009). In a general sense, a cloud computing environment can be defined as public or private
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interconnected computers that provide shared computing power without presenting the
underlying structure (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009).
A more precise definition of cloud computing is provided by NIST and illustrated in
Figure 1. The NIST definition of cloud computing states that the cloud model consists of five
essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models (Mell & Grance,
2011). The essential characteristics consist of broad network access, rapid elasticity,
measured service, and on-demand self-service. The service models include Software as a
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (Iaas). The
deployment models are made up of Public Cloud, Private Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, and
Community Cloud.

Figure 1. Illustration of NIST Cloud Computing Definition

As stated, cloud computing spans several service and deployment models. However,
the essential characteristics are crucial to the definition. Unlike previous IT environments,
cloud computing environments provide broad network access, typically from the Internet. In
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addition, resources can be provisioned and deprovisioned quickly, charges are generally based
on usage, and tenants of these environments perform provisioning and usage activities without
extensive interactions with IT departments or administrators. Furthermore, resources are
shared, many times between different tenants. The multi-tenant nature and lack of control
over the underlying infrastructure open up several security challenges and questions.
The focus of our research is on Public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud
environments. Infrastructure as a Service cloud environments provide cloud tenants with the
capability to provision computing resources to run arbitrary software and operating systems.
The tenant does not control the underlying infrastructure but does have control over the
provisioned instance. Essentially, tenants are given access to computing resources in order to
perform computing activities as needed. The public deployment model provides unique
challenges over other hosted information technology environments in that the environment is
shared possibly among tenants, some of whom may be competitors or bad actors.
To secure these environments, the Cloud Security Alliance, a leading group on cloud
computing security, published the security guidance report that recommends a security
approach which utilizes a defense in depth (SANS, 2001) strategy where people, process, and
layers of technology all play a role in securing a cloud environment (Cloud Security Alliance,
2011). Their approach to securing IaaS cloud environments involves processes, procedures,
controls, and audits. No single technology has been shown to address all of the security
concerns in cloud environments. Furthermore, managing multiple processes, procedures, and
controls in an effective manner is nontrivial with many open research questions.

Statement of the Problem
Our research aims to address security and privacy concerns through the instantiation
of a system composed of novel technical cloud security artifacts. More specifically, we
examine the problems of detecting bad actors in cloud environments earlier while preserving
the privacy of cloud tenants. We posit three design science research questions. First, how can
we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without specific knowledge of tenant applications
in order to preserve privacy? Second, how can we assist cloud providers with interpreting the
output from security controls in an IaaS cloud environment to improve security? And, third,
how can we help protect cloud tenants from insider data theft attacks?
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Objectives of the Project
Our research contribution from this work is demonstrated through three security
artifacts making up a system to assist cloud providers with securing Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) cloud computing environments. Although no one technical solution is going to
completely remove the security threats and risks within multi-tenant cloud computing
environments, additional security artifacts will help to improve the overall security posture of
these environments. As the security posture in these environments improves, cloud tenants
will gain more confidence in the security of these environments. We believe that the long
term end result will be less risk for cloud tenants resulting in increased adoption of IaaS cloud
computing.

Summary
In this chapter, we introduced our research topic and provided an introduction to cloud
computing and some of the security issues. Furthermore, at a high level, we described the
general security challenges facing these environments, stated our research problem, and
provided the objectives of our research project. Chapter two provides a more detailed
discussion on cloud computing and a literature review of security related challenges
associated with these environments.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Cloud computing provides several opportunities for organizations to optimize
resources and reduce costs. However, these benefits do not come without challenges and
security risks. This chapter is broken into two parts, both based on existent literature. First,
we briefly examine the history and provide a detailed definition of cloud computing. Second,
we present the findings of our cloud computing security challenges literature review.

History and Definition of Cloud Computing
In a general sense, a cloud computing environment can be defined as public or private
interconnected computers that provide shared computing power without presenting the
underlying structure (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010). The idea of cloud computing is not new. The
original concepts date back to the 1960s (Kaufman, 2009). Cloud computing as it is known
today has emerged from the construction of large scale commodity-computer datacenters
combined with advances in the World Wide Web and Web 2.0 (Armbrust et al., 2010).
Developments in virtualization technology on commodity hardware helped to provide the
underlying technology for rapid provisioning and de-provisioning of resources in a cost
effective manner. In order to understand cloud computing and associated security issues, one
first must understand the different services offered and deployment models. The consensus
within literature describes cloud computing as one of following services: Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS).
IaaS can be described as offering information technology infrastructure as a service.
This is similar to outsourcing the datacenter. However, unlike traditional data center
outsourcing, cloud tenants use self-service mechanisms to provision and deprovision
resources and may share these environments with other unrelated and unknown tenants. In
addition, cloud customers are typically charged for the resources that they use. Examples of
IaaS include: Amazon AWS, IBM Softlayer, and Oracle’s Cloud Service.
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The PaaS model can be described as a shared development environment that is
provided as a service. The provider offers blocks of code, or application program interfaces
(APIs), which developers use to create web based applications that are stored in the providers
cloud environment. Some examples of PaaS are: IBM Bluemix, Force.com, and Google App
Engine.
In the SaaS model, end users do not purchase software and store it locally. Rather,
software remains in a remote location referred to as a “cloud.” The customer pays based upon
usage. The backend infrastructure is physically shared among customers, but it is logically
divided among end users. Examples of Saas include: Google Docs and Zoho (Almulla &
Chan Yeob, 2010).
There are three deployment models in cloud computing: private cloud, public cloud,
and hybrid, or mixed, cloud environment. Private cloud is for internal use by an organization.
Private clouds reside within an organization’s internal data center. Because the organization
controls the data center, this cloud model is as secure as the data center. Public clouds are
cloud computing environments that are hosted by providers, available to the general public,
and are typically based on a pay per use model. In public implementations and offerings, the
cloud computing infrastructure is available via the Internet (Katzan, 2010). A mixed cloud
environment may be a community cloud or a hybrid cloud deployment. Community cloud is
a shared cloud among multiple organizations usually with a shared interest. Hybrid Clouds
are a mix of public and private cloud environments. Hybrid clouds generally consist of a
private cloud with interfaces to external cloud services. Hybrid clouds provide organizations
with cloud computing advantages but with less risk than public clouds (Katzan, 2010;
Ramgovind, Eloff, & Smith, 2010).
Cloud computing provides two significant advantages over other technologies:
elasticity and cost. First, it provides organizations with flexibility to scale up or scale down
their information technology as needed to meet the demands of the organization. From a
physical resource perspective, cloud computing allows organizations to provision new
resources as needed which relieves some of the planning burden. Cloud users can start using
a small environment and provision upward as needed and only pay for what is used
(Armbrust, et al., 2010; Doelitzscher, Reich, & Sulistio, 2010). This feature, typically termed
elasticity, is one of the primary features that sets cloud computing apart from previous, similar
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technologies (Owens, 2010). Second, it provides computing power at an affordable cost that
would not otherwise be available to users previous to the inception of cloud computing
(Kaufman, 2009).
Some of the key characteristics of cloud computing include: on-demand self-service,
broad network access, resource pooling, and measured service. Thanks to the increase in
affordable network bandwidth, reliable networks, and the Internet, it is possible for cloud
computing providers to offer high quality data and software services that reside in remote data
centers (Cong, Qian, Kui, & Wenjing, 2009). Cloud computing can provide cost effective
pay-as-you-go information technology environments (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010).
Organizations that leverage cloud computing will likely achieve savings in hardware,
software, time provisioning servers, productivity, and system administration. Savings in
hardware will occur due to the reduction in the number of servers required to complete work,
less data center floor space, and reduction in power consumption. Software costs will likely
decrease due to less operation system licenses being needed and reduced software
maintenance cost. Server provisioning takes less time with automated provisioning
technology and tools. Productivity can be improved by cloud support staff rapidly responding
to end user requests. Even system administration costs will likely decrease as less system
administrators will be required to manage more systems (Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010).
The benefits are clear and likely to result in continued adoption of the cloud
computing paradigm. This is evident based on a October 30, 2009 report released by Gartner
Inc. that stated cloud computing has become a top significant technology issue (Chang-Lung,
Uei-Chin, Chang, & Chun-Jung, 2010). However, this paradigm might not be appropriate for
all industries (Kaufman, 2009). A survey of federal government agencies funded by the
Lockheed Martin Cyber Security Alliance found that 70 percent of those surveyed were
concerned about data security, privacy, and integrity in a cloud computing environment
(Anonymous, 2010). In another survey of more than 170 businesses, 50 percent of the
respondents stated concerns with security issues relating to cloud computing resources (Biggs
& Vidalis, 2010). Multiple surveys have shown security to be ranked first as the greatest
challenge or issue of cloud computing (Popovic & Hocenski, 2010). Although cloud services
can relieve organizations of hosting burdens and reduce costs, a number of security concerns
continue to plaque the cloud computing paradigm.
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Cloud Computing Security Challenges Literature Review
Our literature review is conducted in two parts. First, we perform a general literature
review of cloud computing security issues in this chapter. Second, chapters four, five, and six
contain a related works section which presents the results of literature reviews specifically
targeting the components of the system posited in this dissertation. The literature review in
this chapter follows the methodology outlined in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Literature Review Methodology

The literature review revealed 16 general security topics relating to cloud computing
security: Auditability, Availability of Data, Data Location, Data Segregation, Data Storage
Correctness, Disaster Recovery, Investigative Support, Long Term Viability / Data Lock-in,
Performance, Privacy, Regulatory Compliance, Reputation Fate Sharing, Restricted Access,
Security Controls, Trust and SLAs, and Trusted Interfaces. We summarize each of these
topics below:

Auditability
Cloud computing does not necessarily offer a guarantee for data integrity and
availability. It is of critical importance to enable public auditability for cloud data storage so
that the tenants have the ability to use a third party auditor for achieving appropriate risk
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levels for the privacy protection of data (Armbrust, et al., 2010; Cong, Qian, Kui, & Wenjing,
2010).

Availability of Data
The outsourced nature of cloud computing raises concerns of ensuring availability of
data. When an organization moves data and applications to a cloud environment, it loses
control of the data which makes ensuring data availability difficult (Zhang, Wuwong, Li, &
Zhang, 2010). In addition, data availability includes the capability of a cloud provider to
move data to alternative environments if one environment becomes compromised (Armbrust,
et al., 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). An example of where data availability became an issue
in a cloud computing environment is when Liquid Motors lost all of its servers in a data center
raid, then lost its suit against the FBI (Neumann, 2009).
Cloud availability threats also include risks from network based attacks, such as
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, as well as the cloud service provider’s
environment setup and competence level (Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010; Owens, 2010). A
proper risk management process is needed to address the risks of moving applications and
data into a cloud computing environment to ensure availability (Messmer, 2009).

Data Location
Data location is concerned with the physical location of data and whether a cloud
provider will allow a tenant to dictate where data is located (Barnes, 2010; Doelitzscher, et al.,
2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). There are confidentiality issues pertaining to where data is
stored and where the data has travelled. In a cloud environment, data is relocated for
optimized storage, but each time when the data is moved, a copy may be retained at the
location (Acello, 2010; Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010).
One example of where location plays a critical role is with Germany’s Federal Data
Protection Act. This act states that personal data can only be transferred for processing into
countries with the same adequate level of privacy protection laws. Whenever personal data is
acquired and/or processed by third-party instances, the affected person must be notified
according to this act. Users must know the exact location of their data and the cloud
provider’s court of jurisdiction (Doelitzscher, et al., 2010).
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Data Segregation
Data segregation is the assurance that data is separated using trusted encryption
techniques and technologies (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). Data isolation is not
trivial in a multi-tenant environment. Appropriate tools are required to ensure proper data
protection is available in shared environments (Naqvi, Dallons, & Ponsard, 2010). In
addition, concerns around virtualization security exist, including threats specific to virtual
environments and shared hypervisors. Although it may be cost-effective to use a shared
administrative management system to manage multiple customer environments, concerns
around data segregation exist (Owens, 2010).

Data Storage Correctness
Data is typically stored in multiple physical locations in a cloud environment and can
move to other locations rapidly. Maintaining data integrity in these dynamic environments
may present technical issues that increase data integrity risk if not properly managed. Tenants
must be assured that the cloud provider can competently manage the complexity of these
dynamic environments (Cong, et al., 2009).

Disaster Recovery
Recoverability encompasses the ability to recover data in the cloud environment when
an unplanned event occurs. Before moving data or applications to a cloud computing
environment, an organization should understand the cloud computing providers plan for
recovering from disasters (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).

Investigative Support
Investigative support is the ability of the vendor to provide forensic analysis and
investigative support when illegal activities occur (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). If
a security breach occurs, gathering evidence from cloud computing environments can be
difficult because of the underlying dynamic nature of the environment. Data is typically
spread dynamically across multiple hosts and data centers and maintaining chain of custody
during investigation can be problematic (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010; Wolthusen, 2009).
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Legal and regulatory concerns relating to cloud computing jurisdiction of data that
crosses borders are nontrivial. It is not clear if governments have access to cloud data that
spans borders (Kaufman, 2009). Cross-border placement of data can result in compliance
issues and can hinder cybercrime investigations (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010).

Long Term Viability / Data Lock-in
Long term viability refers to concerns surrounding the ability to retrieve data from a
cloud computing environment if the provider no longer meets the needs of the tenant or goes
out of business. There is an ongoing concern about proprietary data formats and whether data
can be retrieved in the case the tenant wishes to leave the cloud environment (Armbrust, et al.,
2010; Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).

Performance
A concern exists relating to performance of the cloud environment and data transfer
bottlenecks (Armbrust, et al., 2010). Virtualization technologies and shared environments
may slow processing capabilities of systems. Furthermore, security controls protecting data
flowing over the Internet and being processed as well as stored within a cloud environment
may reduce performance. Although benefits can be achieved by leveraging cloud computing
for certain applications, there are likely hidden operational and performance costs (Bauer,
2010).

Privacy
When a cloud provider houses large amounts of data, data mining techniques can be
used to derive personal information about tenants. For example, the Google Corporation
offers multiple cloud services and has access to a plethora of data (Chow et al., 2009). Some
have described cloud computing as being similar to a utility. However, unlike a utility, such
as electricity, where an attacker is not interested in accessing a specific electron, an attacker
may be interested in the data stored and transferred into a cloud computing environment.
In addition, ownership of data should be understood when considering moving
sensitive data to cloud environments. Does the cloud provider own the data? Does the
organization placing the data into the environment own the data? Or, if the tenant is running
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an application in a cloud environment that contains tenant customer data, does the customer
with data stored in a data record own the data (Katzan, 2010)? In some cloud computing
environments, a fundamental right to privacy is expected. However, techniques such as
anonymous authentication make it difficult or impossible to track the real user if a transaction
is disputed (Lu, Lin, Liang, & Shen, 2010).

Regulatory Compliance
Regulatory compliance encompasses the issues around meeting the regulatory needs
of an organization (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). Careful measures must be in
place to comply with government regulations and industry standards, such as FFIEC (Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council), HIPPA (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act), and PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards)
(Katzan, 2010). Many of these controls must be incorporated into the environment by the
cloud provider and not the tenant. Concerns around controls, such as encryption, must be
taken into account when assessing the compliance related risks in these environments.
Questions, such as whether the cloud provider has passed a SAS-70 audit, should be asked
(Messmer, 2009). Transparency is especially important for regulatory reasons (Chow, et al.,
2009).
In addition, from the enforcement side, the definition of what constitutes compliance
will not be fully clear until judges and regulators have a better track record and case history to
dictate what is expected and reasonable (Ericson, 2009).

Reputation Fate Sharing
Cloud computing is a shared environment. Hence, if not properly managed, one bad
actor in the cloud environment may have a negative impact on other tenants. For example, if
one tenant is compromised and IP addresses become black listed, other consumers of the
cloud may be impacted by no fault of their own (Armbrust, et al., 2010). A tenant running a
critical application for customers in a cloud environment may become unavailable.
Unfortunately, the customers of that tenant will likely fault the tenant and not the cloud
provider.
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Restricted Access
Restricted access refers to allowing only those who should be permitted to access data
to actually have access to the data. An organization that is placing data in a cloud computing
environment must be certain that the cloud provider has competent and honest administrators
who have put appropriate access controls in place (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). In
addition, proper network security measures are needed to ensure only appropriately
authorized users can access systems, applications, and network data in these shared
environments (Kaufman, 2009).

Security Controls
Different cloud providers have differing levels of security controls in place. One
provider may have a well-established and respected information security program with
controls and monitoring in place while another provider may not. It is important to
understand the security controls and the security postures of cloud providers before placing
trust in their environment (Kaufman, 2009).
A cloud environment is only as secure as its weakest link. The multi-tenant nature of
cloud environments make for prime targets of cybercriminals. The movement towards
increased hosting of data and applications in the cloud and less reliance on user machines for
storing private data is likely to increase the threat of phishing and other attacks targeted at
stealing access credentials (Chow, et al., 2009).

Trust and Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
Data that is moved into the cloud is under control of a third party provider. Access to
that data is in the hands of that cloud provider. A concise service level agreement between
the tenant and cloud provider must be in place in order to reduce risks especially with regard
to availability. The cloud provider must be trusted to deliver on the commitments in the SLA
(Ramgovind, et al., 2010). Service Level Agreements are a key component to defend against
cybercrime and must evolve to counter dynamic attacks from cybercriminals. These
agreements must be well written and monitored (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010).
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In addition to a standard SLA, a Sec-SLA which is a formally negotiated document
that defines security metrics for a cloud computing environment may be considered.
However, for a Sec-SLA to provide value, it must be monitored and enforced which requires
buy-in from the cloud provider (de Chaves, Westphall, & Lamin, 2010).

Trusted Interfaces
Cloud computing is primarily managed through network connections. Public clouds
are managed through the Internet and proper controls are needed to ensure the interface is
secure (Chang-Lung, et al., 2010). It is critical that interfaces are secure and encryption
protocols, such as TLS, are up to date to ensure known vulnerabilities are not used to exploit
weaknesses.

There are a vast number of security-related issues to be considered before an
organization moves its application and data into a cloud computing environment. Some of
these challenges present interesting research topics to be explored and solved. The cloud
computing paradigm introduces new concerns that must be addressed in order to achieve high
levels of adoption for all types of applications and data. Depending on an organization’s
security needs, regulatory compliance requirements, and customer demands, the issues
summarized in this chapter should be considered before moving applications and data into a
cloud computing infrastructure.
Cloud computing certainly has a number of advantages over self-managed data centers
and applications. There is potential for reduced hardware and operating costs along with the
ability to scale on demand. However, it is clear, security challenges are prevalent in these
environments. Organizations considering moving applications and data into a cloud
computing environment must assess the risks and ensure that proper controls and mitigation
plans are in place to achieve an acceptable risk level. Although risks can be mitigated, in
order for cloud computing to thrive to its full potential, more of the security challenges must
be addressed (Lu, et al., 2010).
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Summary
In this chapter, we provided a history and definition for cloud computing. In addition,
we presented our findings from a general literature review on cloud computing security
challenges. The driving force behind our research is to address a subset of these challenges.
More specifically, as mentioned in chapter one, our primary research is focused on the
instantiation of new security artifacts for cloud environments to improve the overall security
posture while preserving tenant privacy with the goal to increase adoption of IaaS cloud
computing environments. Chapter three examines the research methodology we follow while
conducting our work.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information systems discipline studies people, organizations, and technology
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Generally, there are two paradigms used to conduct
this research: behavioral science and design science. Behavioral science is descriptive in
nature and attempts to explain phenomena related to information technology. On the other
hand, design science is prescriptive by definition and aims to improve the performance and
the results gained from using information technology (March & Smith, 1995). Both
approaches are used by researchers in the information systems discipline and are
complimentary in nature. In this chapter, we briefly examine the design science research
methodology. Then, we discuss the design science research approach that we follow while
conducting our research.

Design Science Research
The goal of design science research is to create a means to achieve or better achieve
human goals. This differentiates the methodology from other methodologies, especially those
used in the natural sciences which attempt to explain natural phenomenon but not create them.
Design research may be evaluated and improved upon through research activities where the
researcher executes a build and evaluate process. The build and evaluate research steps may
be followed by theorizing and justification steps which are the activities similar to those found
in the natural sciences. First, during the build phase, the artifact is constructed. Second, the
evaluate step consists of evaluating the artifact’s performance against a set of criteria. Third,
the theorizing phase attempts to explain the interactions with the artifact and the environments
as well as its characteristics. If theories are posited, they must be justified with evidence in
order to test the theory (March & Smith, 1995).
According to March and Smith, the outputs from design science include four
categories, which are also termed artifacts. They include constructs, models, methods, and
implementations. Constructs define the language of the concepts in the domain. Models can
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conceptualize constructs in order to describe tasks, circumstances, or artifacts. Methods can
be described as the steps for accomplishing activities. And, finally, implementations are the
instantiated product (March & Smith, 1995).
Hevner, et al. posit seven guidelines for design research (2004). These guidelines can
be used by researchers to develop quality design research which contributes artifacts to the
information systems (IS) knowledge base. Unlike the natural sciences which examine,
understand, and predict phenomena that occur in nature, design science is concerned with the
study of the artificial and manmade objects. Hevner, et al. suggest that there are five outputs
from design research: constructs, models, methods, instantiations, and better theories.
Furthermore, the general methodology of design research consists of five process steps:
awareness of problem, suggestion, development, evaluation, and conclusion (Vaishnavi &
Kuechler, 2004/5).
Design research is a critical component for the IS discipline for the simple fact that the
entire discipline of information systems studies artifacts that have been designed by humans
to accomplish the goals of humans (March & Smith, 1995). Some argue that the relevance of
information systems is directly related to how research can be applied to design. Figure 3,
below, depicts an information systems research framework posited by Hevner, et al.

Figure 3. Information Systems Research Framework (Hevner, et al., 2004)
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Figure 3 illustrates how business needs and applicable knowledge results in new theories
and artifacts. From a design research perspective, new artifacts are developed, refined and then
both pragmatic and scholarly contributions are made resulting in both relevant and rigorous
research.
The goal of information systems research is to explore the intersection of people,
organizations, and technology (Silver, Markus, & Beath, 1995). While the behavioral science
aspect of information systems is reactive, design research is proactive and attempts to bring into
being new artifacts to solve problems that have utility (Hevner, et al., 2004). Design science
research extends the state-of-the-art in the information systems domain by expanding the
boundaries of known applications of information technology and by exploring problems that
may have not been thought but could be approached using technology (March & Storey, 2008).

Our Approach to Design Science Research
The aim of our research is to bring new relevant cloud computing security artifacts
into being. In order to ensure research rigor and differentiate our work from design by
production, we follow the Peffers, et al. design science research methodology process model
shown in Figure 4 (2007).

Figure 4. Design Science Research Methodology Process Model
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Our approach begins by identifying the problem and motivation behind the problem
by conducting a general literature review of open problems in IaaS cloud computing security.
Based on the literature review, we find gaps in security controls used within cloud computing
environments. First, our work identifies specific security control gaps within Infrastructure as
a Service (IaaS) Public Cloud Computing environments which are used to develop the
motivation behind our work. The output of the literature review leads us down three areas of
research: a new security control to detect attacks at the hypervisor level, a novel system for
managing and acting upon security control alerts, and an approach and artifact for detecting
insider data theft. Second, we define the objectives of our multi-part solution. Third, we
design and develop artifacts that address the objectives of our research. Fourth, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of our artifacts. Fifth and sixth, we evaluate the effectiveness
of our artifacts and system through experimentation and communicate our work to
professional and scholarly communities through publications. Each of these phases are
discussed in more detail in chapter four.

Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the design science research methodology and our
approach to applying this methodology to our work. Chapter four provides an overview of
our system which is composed of the artifacts derived from our research. Furthermore, a
mapping of each component to the Peffers, et al. Design Science Research Methodology is
discussed along with how our work generally fits within this methodology.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM
Following the design science research methodology, we contribute to the information
systems and computing knowledge base by bringing new artifacts into being. These
components are derived following the Peffers, et al. Design Science Research Methodology as
mentioned in chapter three. In order to better understand the relevance of our work, it is
important to view each research artifact as a component in a larger system. In this chapter,
first, we introduce each of the research components. Second, we discuss how the components
fit into an overall system. And, third, we elaborate on the methodology used to construct the
artifacts and provide a mapping to information systems design science research concepts.

Research Components
The aim of our research is to address three security challenges in Infrastructure as a
Service cloud computing environments. First, we derive a new approach for detecting
potential bad actors in the cloud environment by analyzing anomalies in hypervisor
performance data. This approach provides a level of privacy for the cloud tenants while
offering an additional security control to improve bad actor detection and thwart cloud
attacks. Second, we research and develop a methodology and system for reducing the number
of alert messages from security controls in a cloud environment. A defense in depth approach
is recommended for securing IT infrastructures. However, managing security controls across
a vast number of systems can be a challenging task and ineffective if the appropriate alerts are
not properly acted upon. Third, our research examines the problem of data theft and insider
attacks in cloud environments. Cloud providers generally house multiple tenants who may
place sensitive assets into these environments. It is crucial that the providers not only operate
and manage controls to prevent outside attacks, but also attacks from within. In cloud
environments, insider attacks may occur from actors employed by the cloud provider as well
as ill-intentioned tenants wishing to steal data or other assets.
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IaaS Cloud Security System
The three components of our research make up an overall system for enhancing the
security of IaaS cloud computing environments, and include a Hypervisor-based Cloud
Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), a Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification
System for IaaS Cloud (SCIMCS), and a System for Detecting Malicious Insider Data Theft
in IaaS Cloud Environments. Figure 5, below, illustrates how the individual components of
our research work together to make up our distributed multi-component approach and system
for enhanced security of public infrastructure as a service (IaaS) cloud computing
environments.

Figure 5. System Perspective of Research Components

Agents are installed in the cloud environment on the physical nodes that house tenant
virtual machines. These agents collect network and system data from various sources and
feed that data into the components of our system. More specifically, first, the Hypervisorbased Cloud Intrusion Detection System receives metric data from the hypervisors which
control the tenant virtual machines. These metrics are used to detect anomalous behavior,
then compare the anomalous patterns with known attack patterns and classify attacks.
Second, the Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification System for IaaS Cloud ingests
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message alerts from security sensors in the cloud environment, including alerts from the other
two research components. This system presents potential Black Swan events to the security
administrator to help assist with triaging high priority events first. In addition, when trained,
the system displays the type of attack based on previously observed patterns. Third, the
System for Detecting Malicious Insider Data Theft in IaaS Cloud Environments examines
login activity and data transfers on the physical node. Abnormal patterns in these two events
coupled with system state data are shown to detect potential insider data theft in cloud
environments with a high level of accuracy.
While each component contributes to the knowledge base, the combination of these
three components makes up a system that provides a new set of security controls to improve
the security posture of IaaS cloud computing environments. Future chapters in this
dissertation reveal the detailed research and results for each component.

Research Methodology and Research Rigor
As discussed in chapter three, our research is accomplished using the design science
research methodology. More specifically, we follow the Peffers, et al. Design Science
Research Methodology to ensure research rigor. Table 1, summarizes the mapping of our
research to the model.
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Table 1. Design Science Methodology Component Mapping

Peffers, et al., Design
Science Research
Methodology Step

Chapter 5: Hypervisorbased Cloud Intrusion
Detection System
(HCIDS)

Chapter 6: Streaming
Intrusion Monitoring
and Classification
System (SCIMCS)

Chapter 7: System
for Detecting
Malicious Insider
Data Theft

Identify Problem and
Motivate

A gap exists between
protecting the cloud users
from outsider attacks using
perimeter security
approaches and attacks from
mischievous users who have
penetrated the perimeter
security controls.
The creation of a hypervisorbased intrusion detection
system for cloud
environments.

A need to improve the
monitoring of security
system alerts and more
importantly knowing
which events to act upon
immediately exists within
cloud environments.

New security controls are
needed to detect and
prevent insider data theft.
This is especially true in
multi-tenant cloud
environments.

The creation of a system
and approach to assist
administrators with
gaining a better
understanding of
important events and
classification of such
events.
The system consists of
three steps: 1) Summarize
and Score, 2) Detect
Anomalies, and 3)
Classify Attacks and is
developed using Python
and IBM Streams.

The creation of a new
approach and system for
detecting insider data
theft.

Define Objectives of a
Solution

Design & Develop

The system is designed and
developed using libvirt,
Python, and IBM Streams.

Demonstration

We demonstrate and verify
the effectiveness of the
proposed system in a small
cloud environment using the
Eucalyptus infrastructure.

Evaluation

Using developed signatures,
we are able to detect 100
percent of two types of
denial of service attacks
within a cloud environment:
denial of service attacks
against a cloud instance and
a denial of service attacks
from a cloud instance against
another cloud instance.

Communication

IEEE International
Conference on Computing,
Networking and
Communication (ICNC),
CNC Workshop, Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA, Feb 3-6, 2014.

We demonstrate and
verify the effectiveness of
the proposed system in a
small cloud environment
using the Eucalyptus
infrastructure.
We observe a total alert
reduction of 95.9 percent
with a zero miss rate for
problematic alarms. In
addition, we demonstrate
a 100 percent
classification rate for
trained attacks.

IEEE International
Conference on Cloud
Computing (CLOUD),
San Francisco, USA, June
27 - July 2, 2016.

A system profiling
approach is used for
detecting abnormal login
activity and data transfers
from IaaS cloud
computing nodes hosting
tenant virtual machines
using Python and IBM
Streams.
We demonstrate and
verify the effectiveness of
the proposed system in a
small cloud environment
using the Eucalyptus
infrastructure.
We observe 100 percent
detection of abnormal
login activity and data
copies to outside systems
and a zero false positive
detection rate when
anomalies in active user
counts and bytes
transmitted is detected
along with supporting
system state data.
IEEE Global
Communications
Conference
(GLOBECOM),
December 4-8 December,
2016.
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In accordance with the Hevner, et al. research framework, each component in our
system contributes relevant work to the cloud computing environment along with rigorous
design science research to the knowledge base. Table 2 summarizes the contributions of our
work according to the Hevner, et al framework.
Table 2. Hevner, et al. Research Framework Mapping

Artifact
Hypervisor-based Cloud
Intrusion Detection System
SCIMCS
Insider Data Theft Detector

Application in the
Appropriate Environment
Technology: Infrastructure
Technology: Applications
Technology: Infrastructure
Technology: Applications
Technology: Infrastructure
Technology: Applications

Addition to the Knowledge
Base
Foundations: Methods
Foundations: Instantiations
Foundations: Methods
Foundations: Instantiations
Foundations: Methods
Foundations: Instantiations

Each artifact of the overall system contributes to IaaS cloud computing infrastructure
security through instantiation and demonstration of novel security components that reduce
cloud deployment risk by improving security in these environments. Additionally, the
research introduces new methods for detecting attacks and better understanding alerts in these
environments.

Summary
In chapter four, we introduced each of our research components and discussed how the
components fit into an overall system. Then, we elaborated on the methodology used to
construct the artifacts and provided a mapping to information systems design science research
concepts. Chapters five, six, and seven provide the details for each of the research
components.
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CHAPTER 5
HYPERVISOR-BASED CLOUD INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEM
One of the significant challenges in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing
is the lack of ability for cloud users to control security protection in the cloud infrastructure.
In a survey of more than 170 businesses, 50 percent of the respondents stated concerns with
security issues relating to cloud computing resources (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009). To help
address these concerns, controls have been proposed by the Cloud Security Alliance, many of
which are process based and are subject to noncompliance and human error. For the controls
that are automated and machine based, a gap exists between protecting the cloud users from
outsider attacks using perimeter security approaches and attacks from mischievous users who
have penetrated the perimeter security controls. These outside attackers become insiders
within the cloud environment and can attack other virtual machines within the cloud
infrastructure.
One automated security control recommended by the Cloud Security Alliance for
cloud computing environments is an intrusion detection system (Cloud Security Alliance,
2011). There are two traditional types of intrusion detection systems: host based and network
intrusion detection systems (Dhage & Meshram, 2012). Host based intrusion detection
systems are composed of an agent on a host system that examines system calls, logs, filesystem modifications, and other host activities to detect intrusions. Network intrusion
detection systems monitor network traffic and the content of packets in order to discover
malicious traffic.
Both host based and network based intrusion detection systems have advantages and
limitations. Network intrusion detection systems attempt to address attacks from outsiders and
generally have limited effectiveness against insider attacks (M. B. Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo,
2008). These and other perimeter security controls, such as firewalls, may be less effective in
cloud computing environments because of the shared multi-tenancy nature of cloud
computing (Sheridan & Cooper, 2012). It is common for multiple cloud users to reside
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virtually partitioned on a single physical machine which opens up the possibility for attacks
over virtual or internal networks (Lori, 2010). Host based intrusion detection systems can be
effective but typically must be monitored and managed by cloud users. This approach can be
difficult for cloud users who have several instances in a cloud environment. Furthermore, host
based intrusion detection systems can be disabled by a skilled attacker that has breached the
instance.
In this chapter, we propose a new type of intrusion detection system, a Hypervisorbased Cloud Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), to address some of the challenges with
traditional intrusion detection systems in cloud environments. HCIDS examines system
metrics for cloud instances directly from the hypervisor to seek out potential misuse patterns.
Our contributions in this work include, but are not limited to:


We propose a hypervisor-based intrusion detection system for cloud environments.



We demonstrate and verify the effectiveness of the proposed system in a real cloud
environment.



Using developed signatures, we are able to detect 100 percent of two types of denial of
service attacks within a cloud environment: denial of service attacks against a cloud
instance and a denial of service attacks from a cloud instance against another cloud
instance.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, related work is discussed.

Second, the system design of our hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection system is
presented. Third, the system is demonstrated and results are discussed. Fourth, our work is
summarized and we discuss future works.

Related Work
Our work consists of three components: the use of performance signatures for
detecting attacks on a system, detecting anomalies in virtualized environments from outside of
the virtual machine, and an intrusion detection framework for cloud environments.
The use of performance signatures to detect malicious activity and intrusions is
proposed by Avritzer, et. al and Oppenheimer and Martonosi (Avritzer, Tanikella, James,
Cole, & Weyuker, 2010; Oppenheimer & Martonosi, 1997). Oppenheimer and Martonosi
present a model for using performance signature data to detect system security violations.
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More recently, Avritzer, Cole, and Weyuker demonstrate an approach for detecting attacks on
software systems using system performance signatures. In their work, they model the
performance characteristics of a system with a reasonable background load to simulate system
usage and examine CPU, memory, I/O and network usage metrics to detect buffer overflow,
stack overflow, SQL injection, denial of service (DoS), and man-in-the-middle attacks. The
results from their work show promise for using performance signatures to profile attacks.
An approach for detecting attacks in a virtualized environment outside of the virtual
machine instance is to use virtual machine monitor introspection (Christodorescu, Sailer,
Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009). Garkinkel and Rosenblum present an architecture and
prototype using virtual machine introspection to detect attacks in virtual machine instances
(Garfinkel & Rosenblum, 2003). In their work, they demonstrate how introspection of the
virtual machine can detect rootkits and backdoors, Trojan horses, packet sniffers, and worms
by inferring software state based on a priori knowledge of its structure.
Cloud computing intrusion detection is an active research area. To address
performance issues with intrusion detection in a cloud computing environment, Dhage, et al
propose a distributed intrusion detection system which averts heavy loads on a central
intrusion detection server (Dhage & Meshram, 2012). Their work places multiple mini
intrusion detection instances throughout the cloud environment which communicate with a
controller. The controller stores pertinent data in cloud logs and uses it for intrusion detection
analysis. To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of network intrusion detection systems,
Lin, et al. present a technique for using hypervisors in the cloud to inventory operating
systems and services on nodes (Lin, 2009). Larger security solutions are also suggested such
as the Security Audit as a Service architecture for cloud computing environments posited by
Doelitzscher, et. al (Doelitzscher, Reich, & Sulistio, 2010). Their six-layer security model
utilizes modules, including a crypto module, a customer public key infrastructure, an SLA
monitoring system, a policy module, a logging module, and an intrusion detection system.

Design and Development
Hypervisors have access to performance data for the virtual machines that they host.
This data provides insight into the activities occurring within a virtual machine without
having direct knowledge of the actual operating system, applications or private data residing
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within the virtual machine. In our proposed Hypervisor-based Cloud Intrusion Detection
System (HCIDS), we utilize performance metrics from hypervisors within a cloud
environment to detect attack patterns. This approach differs from other performance based
intrusion detection systems in that it removes the requirement of having software installed on
the host computer, or virtual machine in a virtualized cloud environment. Forcing cloud
computing users to install additional software in their instances can be problematic and may
be resisted by cloud users. Furthermore, gathering performance metrics directly from the
hypervisor and not from the operating system makes our solution operating system agnostic.
Using patterns in streaming performance metrics from the hypervisor, we are able to detect
and classify abnormal usage.

Performance Metrics
The performance metrics used in our work are retrieved from the hypervisors hosting
virtual machines within the cloud computing environment. Performance metric data for
network data transmitted, network data received, block device read data, block device write
data, and CPU utilization is analyzed and is commonly available from all the major
virtualization platforms using application programming interfaces (APIs). Our approach
retrieves each of these metrics every second. We do not analyze memory utilization because
memory allocation is performed once at startup and does not vary with usage making it
irrelevant for detecting attacks.

Framework
Our proposed framework consists of three high level components: a controller node,
end point nodes, and a notification service. First, the controller node is responsible for near
real time analysis of performance data for every virtual machine in the cloud computing
environment. Second, the end point nodes gather data on every virtual machine running in the
cloud environment from the virtual machine hypervisor and present the data to the controller
node. Third, the notification service provides notification when an attack signature has been
identified. Figure 6 illustrates our proposed design architecture.
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Figure 6. Conceptual Diagram of Proposed System

Controller Node
The controller node is a service that resides within the cloud environment. Its purpose
is to collect and analyze data in near real time from the end point nodes. As data arrives, it is
analyzed using a sliding window approach. Windows of performance metrics are analyzed
for signatures that suggest suspicious activity.

Endpoint Nodes
Endpoint nodes are a conceptual component. They may be agents on each physical
system that contains a hypervisor, built within a hypervisor, or API calls to the hypervisor.
The purpose of these nodes is to gather and format data from hypervisors and send it to the
controller node for analysis. These nodes reside outside of virtual machines and cannot be
controlled or manipulated by cloud computing users.
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Notification Service
The notification service is used to provide alerts that the system has detected a
signature of a potential attack. The notification can be a message in a log file, an email, or
input into another intrusion detection system.

Demonstration and Evaluation
We demonstrate the feasibility of using hypervisor performance metrics to detect
attacks on virtual machines in a cloud computing environment using the Eucalyptus
infrastructure. Eucalyptus is a private and hybrid cloud solution that is in use by a number of
large organizations.

Eucalyptus Test Environment
The Eucalyptus cloud computing system is composed of five main components: cloud
controller, Walrus, cluster controller, storage controller, and one or more node controllers
(“Eucalyptus Components,” 2013). In our test cloud environment, the cloud controller,
Walrus server, cluster controller and storage controller all reside on a single physical server.
Furthermore, our environment consists of two node controllers which reside on independent
physical machines. Table 3 summarizes the hardware configuration of our test environment.
Table 3. Simulated Cloud Environment Specification

Component

Configuration

Controller

AMD Athon™ 64x2 Dual Core Processor
4 GB RAM
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs)

Endpoint 1

AMD Phenom™ II X4 965 Quad Core Processor
8 GB RAM
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs)

Endpoint 2

AMD Phenom™ 9150e Quad Core Processor
6 GB RAM
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs)

31
Simulation Implementation Detail
This section describes the components of our system. First, the controller node is
explained. Second, the endpoint nodes are examined. And, third, the notification service is
discussed. Figure 7 illustrates the implementation detail and flow between components.

Figure 7. Implementation Detail

Controller Node
The controller node resides on a machine outside of the Eucalyptus infrastructure and
is prototyped using the IBM Streams product. The controller node logic is implemented using
IBM Streams Processing Language (SPL) (Zikopoulos & Eaton, 2011) and listens on a UDP
socket. Hypervisor performance data is rapidly ingested and analyzed using two sets of
sliding windows. First, ten second sliding windows aggregate data on CPU percent
utilization, block device reads, block device writes, network packets received, and network
packets transmitted. As metric values enter sliding windows, the mean and maximum values
are calculated. Anomalies are defined as values that exceed two times the mean. Second, a
three second sliding window is used to detect attacks. This window populates with anomalies
detected from the first sliding window. If an anomaly occurs three times, consecutively, it is
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labeled as a potential attack pattern and compared to a set of known attack patterns.
Unrecognized patterns are ignored.

Endpoint Nodes
Two Eucalyptus nodes are used which contain multiple virtual machines. A Python
script gathers CPU, block device, and network device metrics using the libvirt API and is
deployed on each node. This script samples performance metrics every second and sends the
data in comma separated value (csv) format to the Controller Node using the UDP protocol
for each virtual machine running on the node.

Notification Service
The IBM Streams product performs the role of the notification service. The attacks are
visualized in a table and written to a file. The file can be monitored using any common file
monitoring tool.

Simulated Activities
The effectiveness of the system is demonstrated by running denial of service attacks
from and against a virtual machine in the cloud environment with and without a simulated
valid user workload.

Simulated Workload
An Apache web server resides on the cloud instance which serves up a web page that
randomly performs different sized reads and writes at intervals of two and five seconds. For
each simulated activity, three runs are conducted three times. The first run is performed
without a user workload. The second run is conducted with five concurrent users accessing
the cloud instance’s HTTP server webpage. And, the third run is performed with 10 users
concurrently accessing the cloud instance’s HTTP server webpage.

Simulated Attacks
Two types of denial of service (DoS) attacks are performed to examine the
effectiveness of our approach: a HTTP flood attack against a cloud instance and a syn flood
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attack from the cloud instance against another virtual machine in the cloud environment.
First, a denial of service attack against the cloud instance is performed using the tool
DoSHTTP (“Socketsoft.net,” 2013) from outside the cloud environment using a Windows 7
machine. This attack uses 500 sockets to issue 10,000 requests. Second, hping3 (Sanfilippo,
2013) is used to create a syn flood attack from within the virtual machine to attack another
virtual machine in the cloud.

Attack analysis approach
The primary purpose of our analysis is to determine whether hypervisor performance
metrics can be used to detect and classify attacks while minimally flagging normal usage as
attacks. We do this by manually observing patterns in performance data when DoS attacks
are occurring and creating signatures from these patterns. There are three goals for the attack
signatures. The first goal is to reduce or eliminate false positives. A false positive occurs
when normal usage is labeled as an attack. An intrusion detection system with a high false
positive rate will be ignored or disabled. The second goal is to detect all valid attacks. The
more attacks not detected, the less effective the system becomes. And, the third goal is to
properly classify the type of an attack. Proper classification is useful for responding to
attacks.
With these goals in mind, we perform both DoS attacks three times for approximately
15 minutes under three stress conditions: no users, five concurrent users, and a load of 10
concurrent users. The variability in workload improves the quality of the experimentation by
better reflecting a real world cloud application. Furthermore, each run is performed three
times to examine the repeatability of results.
We manually observe repeatable anomaly patterns in the hypervisor performance
metrics while the attacks occur and create signatures for the attacks. Each signature is
composed of five commonly available hypervisor metric variables: Packets Transmitted
(Packets TX), Packets Received (Packets RX), Block Device Read Requests (Block Device
Read Req), Block Device Write Request (Block Device Write Req), and CPU Utilization
(CPU Util.)
A signature is defined by Boolean values for each performance metric. A metric is
considered true in a signature if it is repeatedly detected as an anomaly for three consecutive
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10 second sliding windows. As previously described, an anomaly is defined as a metric value
exceeding twice the mean in a 10 second sliding window. We find that this technique reduces
false positives caused by normal system variability. Using this approach, we code patterns for
the DoS attacks from and against a cloud instance. The patterns represent the signature for an
attack.
The system is applied to normal running conditions without attacks in order to
measure false positives. The same three system stress conditions (e.g., no user activity, five
concurrent users, and 15 concurrent users) are performed and the results are recorded.

Results and Observations
The coding of performance metrics reveals repeatable signature patterns for the two
DoS attacks. Table 4 summarizes the attack signatures derived from manual observations
during multiple system runs under the three stress conditions.
Table 4. Signatures

Attack

CPU
Utilization

Packets
Received

Packets
Transmitted

True

Block
Block
Device Read Device
Request
Write
Request
False
False

HTTP DoS
attack
against cloud
instance
Syn Flood
attack from
cloud
instance

True

True

True

False

False

True

Any

To measure the accuracy of signatures, three test runs are performed: DoS attack
against the instance, DoS attack from the instance, and no attack for a baseline measurement.
Each test run is conducted over a 45 minute period consisting of three 15 minute stress
conditions: no user activity, five concurrent users, and 10 concurrent users. Attacks are issued
three times during each stress condition, or nine times total per test run. Table 5 summarizes
the results of our findings.
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Table 5. Accuracy

Attack

HTTP DoS attack
against cloud
instance
Syn Flood attack
from cloud instance
No attack

False Positives
(number of false
positives / number of
metric sets analyzed
that were not
attacks)
<1% (8/3043)

False Negatives
(number of attacks
not detected /
number of attacks
issued)

Misclassifications
(number of attacks
incorrectly classified
/ number of attacks
issued)

0% (0/9)

0% (0/9)

1.4% (43/3179)

0% (0/9)

0% (0/9)

0% (0/3091)

N/A

N/A

A false positive is counted when a set of performance metric data is detected as an
attack during normal usage. A false negative is defined as an attack that is not detected. And,
misclassifications are attacks that are incorrectly classified as other attacks (e.g., a syn flood
attack is classified as a HTTP DoS attack.)
The data from our findings indicate that streaming hypervisor performance metrics can
be used to detect denial of service attacks within a cloud environment. Every denial of
service attack performed by the instance and against the instance is detected and properly
classified. The false positives are mostly detected during the 10 user workload run. We
theorize that this workload may emulate a denial of service attack in the environment.
Additional investigation is needed to prevent these false positives. Also, it is noteworthy that
no false positives are detected when an attack is not applied.

Comparison with other approaches
The work presented in Avritzer et al (2010) and Oppenheimer & Martonosi (1997)
uses a host-based intrusion detection approach to run a monitoring agent on a computer to
retrieve performance metrics from the operating system or applications. Our proposed
approach does not require any additional software installed in virtual machines. In
Christodorescu et al. (2009) and Garfinkel & Rosenblum (2003), virtual machine
introspection is used. Virtual machine introspection is effective to detect malicious behavior
in virtual machines. However, it examines the detailed state of the virtual machine such as
memory and register contents and I/O device flags. Cloud users storing confidential data on a
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cloud instance may have concerns with the snooping of memory on their virtual machines.
Further, it also requires knowledge and modification of the underlying operating system. Our
approach does not require direct knowledge of the operating system running in virtual
machines. We examine the performance metric usage patterns over time. The work in Dhage
& Meshram (2012), Doelitzscher et al. (2010), and Lin (2009) uses distributed intrusion
detection system which averts heavy loads on a central intrusion detection server. In our
work, an agent is installed on each hypervisor node which communicates with a central
decision node.
HCIDS offers at least two advantages over existing intrusion detection techniques.
First, monitoring is done outside of the virtual machine and is independent of the operating
system or applications running within the virtual machines. This removes the burden of users
having to install additional software in their images and cannot be compromised from within
the virtual machine instance. Second, insider attacks that potentially would not be detected
using perimeter security controls can be detected. If an attacker takes over an instance and
then uses that instance to attack other instances in the cloud computing environment,
perimeter firewalls and intrusion detection systems generally would not detect this malicious
activity.

Conclusion and Future Work
The initial findings from this work indicate that hypervisor performance signatures can
indeed be successfully used to detect attacks in a cloud computing environment. This
approach offers advantages over other intrusion detection systems alone. First, our
framework does not require knowledge of the underlying operating system or applications run
on cloud instances. We examine patterns of performance metrics from outside of the instance
directly from the hypervisor without placing a burden on the cloud user. Second, the
proposed hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection system can be integrated with and
complement existing intrusion detection systems and perimeter defenses to improve the
security within cloud environments. When using a defense in depth security strategy,
multiple security systems should be considered to detect and thwart attackers.
Our experiments and testing demonstrate the feasibility of using hypervisor metrics for
detecting denial of service attacks both against and from a cloud instance. Additional
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statistical approaches to extract attack patterns and system tuning will be explored next.
Further attacks, including enumeration, insider password cracking, and network sniffing will
be profiled to test the accuracy of detection and classification systems. Approaches to reduce
false positives will be examined. And, a comparison analysis of traditional approaches and
our system will be conducted.
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CHAPTER 6
A STREAMING INTRUSION MONITORING AND
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
A data breach reported on December 18, 2013 occurred against the Target
Corporation. It is believed that the bad actors captured 40 million payment card reports and
70 million customer records. The cause of this significant loss is believed to be the result of
inadequate monitoring and alert response (Cobb, 2014). Unfortunately, security attacks and
breaches occur against organizations of all types and sizes. Security professionals and
researchers accept the premise that no system has perfect security (Mandiant, 2014).
Furthermore, security challenges have been noted as primary reasons for avoiding adoption of
cloud computing by organizations (Hay, Nance, Bishop, Brian, & Hay, 2011; Ren et al.,
2012).
Cloud computing offers unique challenges over single tenant data centers. More
specifically, cloud computing infrastructure as a service (IaaS) environments generally consist
of multiple tenants running a variety of applications with differing privacy and confidentiality
requirements. Although IaaS cloud environments introduce challenges above and beyond
private data centers, the techniques for securing both environments are similar. The Cloud
Security Alliance suggests an approach that includes a defense in depth (SANS, 2001)
strategy where people, process, and layers of technology all play a role in securing the cloud
environment (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011).
As observed from incidents such as the Target Corporation breach, monitoring
intrusion detection system alerts and more importantly knowing which events to act upon
immediately may be the difference between a minor breach and significant damage to an
organization. This challenge is amplified in a multi-tenant IaaS environment where multiple
tenants may host sensitive data and run services that perform diverse computing activities.
Our work supports a defense in depth approach by leveraging multiple distributed
intrusion detection and security system sensors in an IaaS cloud computing environment. We
propose a streaming cloud intrusion monitoring and classification system (SCIMCS) to assist
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cloud providers with multiple security systems by filtering noisy alert messages and
classifying previously observed attacks.
Our approach consists of three steps: 1) Summarize and Score, 2) Detect Anomalies,
and 3) Classify Attacks. In this chapter, we detail our approach and demonstrate its
effectiveness through implementation and experimentation in an IaaS cloud environment
using the Eucalyptus cloud framework. We observe a total alert reduction of 95.9 percent
with a zero miss rate for problematic alarms. In addition, we demonstrate a 100 percent
classification rate for trained attacks. Our contributions from this work include, but are not
limited to:


A weighted noisiness approach for alert prioritization and classification.



A framework for IaaS cloud environments using the proposed approach consisting of
five components: Sensor Agents, Ingestor, Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier.



We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in an IaaS cloud environment
using the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure by executing and classifying real attacks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, related work is discussed.

Second, the system design of our streaming cloud intrusion monitoring and classification
system is presented. Third, the system is demonstrated and results are discussed. Fourth, our
work is summarized and we discuss future works.

Related Work
In this section, first, we summarize existent related work in four subcategories: alert
aggregation, alert correlation, alert ranking and classification, as well as cloud based
approaches. Second, we summarize how our approach is novel.
Alert Aggregation
Debar and Wespi introduce a system using Tivoli Enterprise Console that aggregates
and correlates data from probes. Correlation relationships are created using explicit rules and
derived rules from configuration information. Aggregation relationships are created using an
algorithm that groups events together using these rules. They demonstrate the effectiveness
of their solution and display the results using alert and alarm views (Debar & Wespi, 2001).
Fan, Ye, and Deng demonstrate a distributed alert aggregation system model that uses a
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transform agent to convert intrusion detection system (IDS) messages. Original alerts are
categorized into classes and actions which can be issued. Their work is tested using network
data (Fan, Jihua, & Mingxing, 2009). Hofmann and Sick propose algorithms for alert
aggregation based on probabilistic models of a current situation using alert attributes. They
provide both an offline and data stream alert aggregation approach (Hofmann & Sick, 2011).
Saad and Traore present semantic analysis and ontology engineering techniques to aggregate
and fuse intrusion detection system alerts. Their work demonstrates an approach for lossless
alert aggregation that does not require perfect matches of alert attributes (Saad & Traore,
2011).

Alert Correlation
Valeur, et al. present a correlation process and framework for addressing large
volumes of messages output from intrusion detection systems. They use alerts from multiple
systems and create intrusion reports or tag them as non-relevant. Their approach uses alert ids
and alert names to perform mapping and normalization (Valeur, Vigna, Kruegel, &
Kemmerer, 2004). Qin and Lee put forth an approach to analyze INFOSEC alerts and detect
attack strategies. In their work, Bayesian inference and the Granger Causality test is used to
correlate alerts (Singhal, Qin, & Lee, 2007). Ma, Li, and Zhang present an approach to fuse
alerts based on timestamp and remove duplicates to reduce alerts. Evidence threat probability
is calculated using Dempster-Shafer theory. Furthermore, they combine network and
intrusion detection data and use Hidden Markov Models (HMM) to calculate a network risk
distribution (Ma, Li, & Zhang, 2009). Wen, Xian and Zhou introduce a system for alert
fusion and correlation. In their work, they use a target-oriented policy where alerts are
clustered when requirements of duplication categorization and co-operating are met (Wen,
Xiang, & Zhou, 2010).

Alert Ranking and Classification
Jiang, et al. present work on importance ranking of alerts using invariant relationships
to map metric thresholds to other metric thresholds. They use Autoregressive models to learn
linear relationships between metrics. And, they use alert peer review to assist with
trustworthiness of alerts (Jiang, Chen, Yoshihira, & Saxena, 2011). Gupta, et al. present the
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PIKE architecture which uses a binary classifier to classify an alert as relevant or irrelevant
based on knowledge-based evaluation. They propose a classifier that uses a calculated score
as the characteristic for classification. The effectiveness is demonstrated using contextual
information as a basis of IDS alert classification (Gupta, Joshi, Bhattacharjee, & Mundada,
2012).
Cloud Based Approaches
The Cloud Security Alliance suggests an approach that includes a defense in depth
strategy where people, process, and layers of technology all play a role in securing a cloud
environment (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011). Furthermore, NIST provides Guidelines on
Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing in SP800-144 (Jansen & Grance, 2011).
Both of these pragmatic works provide recommendations for securing a cloud environment
but leave the specific details to cloud providers.
Technical cloud solutions exist in literature. Gul and Hussain present a cloud
intrusion detection model. They put forth a multi-threaded cloud intrusion detection system
that monitors the network along with a third party monitoring system (Gul & Hussain, 2011).
Log monitoring and management systems in cloud computing environments based on usage
are also known (Lee, Park, Eom, & Chung, 2011). And, collaborative intrusion detection
systems in cloud environments have been posited (Mohamed, Adil, Saida, & Hicham, 2013).

Our Approach
Information overload theory has been applied to the field of advertising (Anderson &
de Palma, 2005). In marketing, the outcome of too much information is the reduced
effectiveness of advertising investment. Information overload theory can be applied to
security control effectiveness. Accuracy aside, the effectiveness of a security system
dramatically decreases when an administrator is overwhelmed with too much information.
We set out to reduce the information overload problem in IaaS cloud by
accomplishing three objectives: 1) to present cloud providers with alerts of importance from
multiple systems while filtering lesser important alarms without sensor reconfiguration, 2) to
properly classify attacks based on filtered alerts, and 3) to present a scalable and dynamic
approach. We accomplish our objectives using a novel three step approach: 1) Summarize
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and Score, 2) Detect Anomalies, and 3) Classify Attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to examine alert prioritization and classification in IaaS Cloud Environments
using anomalies in calculated urgency scores. Using these reduced alerts, attacks are
classified. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by executing, detecting, and
classifying real attacks. Unlike previous works, we do not use simulation on test data sets, but
actual system state and attacks.

Design and Development
An IaaS cloud environment typically consists of virtual machines hosted on physical
nodes. A single node may host virtual machine instances from multiple tenants. To secure
this shared dynamic environment, the Cloud Security Alliance recommends a defense in depth
approach (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011). Similarly, NIST provides security guidance for
cloud providers (Jansen & Grance, 2011). However, managing a defense in depth approach is
non-trivial. Several layers of security mechanisms must be deployed and monitored. When a
threat is detected, it must be appropriately acted upon. A common problem with monitoring
such approaches is the sheer volume of alarms generated, some of which are false positives,
and others are informational. It is challenging for cloud providers to quickly interpret which
events to act upon and the priority of such events.
Another challenge is the dynamic nature of cloud environments. Tenant instances
may come and go. As the needs of providers grow, nodes are added dynamically to the
environment. In other cases, nodes are removed due to system faults or maintenance.
Security sensors may come and go in these environments. Therefore, our system must
tolerate the inherent changing nature of these environments.

Approach
To address the problem of information overload from security sensors in dynamic IaaS
cloud environments, we propose our distributed cloud intrusion monitoring and classification
system. Our system consists of a three step approach: 1) Summarize and Score, 2) Detect
Anomalies, and 3) Classify Attacks shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Three Step Approach

Summarize and Score
Summarize and score ingests alerts from security sensors in a cloud environment and
calculates an urgency score for the alert message. This approach is based on the concept of
black swan events, or rare events that have a significant future impact (Damiani, 2009; Taleb,
2010; Taylor & Williams, 2008). In an IaaS cloud environment with several sensors reporting
data, we derive a formula for detecting these rare events. The urgency score is calculated
using the number of times a message is reported historically in the entire cloud environment,
by the individual node, and the count of alerts generated by the sensor.
First, we calculate the message noise in the overall cloud environment:
𝑚
𝑓(𝑚, 𝑐) = ( )
𝑐
where 𝑚 is the number of times the alert message occurred and 𝑐 is the total count of all
historical alert messages. Next, we calculate the message noise for the reporting node (e.g.,
we determine how many times this alert has occurred at the node level):
𝑓(𝑚′ , 𝑐 ′ ) = (

𝑚′
)
𝑐′

where 𝑚′ is the number of times the alert message occurred on the node and 𝑐 ′ is the total
number of messages reported by the node. Third, we calculate the message urgency score:
1
1
𝑈𝑀 = 1 − (𝑓(𝑚′ , 𝑐 ′ ) × (1 − (1 − )) + 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑐) × (1 − ))
𝑛
𝑛
where 𝑛 is the number of nodes in the cloud environment. In addition to message urgency,
we calculate sensor urgency:
𝑚𝑠
𝑓(𝑚𝑠 , 𝑠) = ( )
𝑠
where 𝑚𝑠 is the total number of messages reported by all sensors and 𝑠 is the sensor count in
the environment. Then, we calculate the urgency by the specific sensor reporting the message:
𝑓(𝑚𝑠 ′, 𝑠′) = (

𝑚𝑠 ′
)
𝑠′
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where 𝑚𝑠 ′ is the number of times the alert occurred from the sensor and 𝑠′ is the total number
of alerts reported from the sensor. Finally, we calculate the sensor urgency score 𝑈𝑆 :
1
1
𝑈𝑆 = 1 − (𝑓(𝑚𝑠 ′ , 𝑠 ′ ) × (1 − (1 − )) + 𝑓(𝑚𝑠 , 𝑠) × (1 − ))
𝑡
𝑡
where 𝑡 is the total number of sensors in the cloud environment. Using these two scores, we
derive an overall urgency value, 𝑈, for the alert:
𝑈 = 𝑈𝑀 × 𝑈𝑆
This value is used as the urgency score for the alert message in the system. A value of 1.0 is
most urgent, or a possible black swan event, while a value of 0 is least urgent. In addition,
sensors that infrequently report are given higher weight than those that commonly report. The
combination of weighted event messages and sensor output increases the priority of rare
anomalous events and ranks alerts properly amongst peers.

Detect Anomalies
Detect anomalies utilizes alert messages and the urgency score from Summarize and
Score to detect abnormal patterns in scores using a time series k nearest neighbor approach
(Sutton, 2012). We use window sizes of 15 and 30 tuples based on empirical
experimentation. The choice to use this approach is based on simplicity, accuracy, and
performance.
In addition, Detect Anomalies uses the mean and standard deviation of previously
observed urgency scores to rank anomalous messages as important. Values that fall outside of
one standard deviation and within two standard deviations from the mean are labeled with
medium importance. Values that fall outside of two standard deviations from the mean are
labeled as high importance. Both medium and high alerts are considered potential threats.

Classify Attacks
Classify attacks ingests anomalous alert messages from Detect Anomalies and uses 10
second tumbling windows to create signatures of alert messages and sensor ids. Bayesian
classification (Mihaescu, n.d.) is applied to signatures for classification of the potential attack.
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Naive Bayesian classification is chosen because the classifier model is easily implemented,
performs quickly, and has a history of success for classification (Rish, 2001).
In addition to attack pattern classification, prioritized alert messages are displayed
based on the standard deviation of the urgency score compared to previously observed scores.
If an attack pattern is unknown, the window of alert messages may be used to train the
classifier by applying the alerts to a classification rule. If an unclassified attack occurs, the
classifier can be placed into train mode and the attack is replayed and labeled. Future similar
patterns are recognized and classified as an attack defined by the specified label.

Framework
Our proposed framework consists of five components: Sensor Agents, Ingestor,
Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier. Figure 9 provides a visual representation of the
components.

Figure 9. SCIMCS Framework Components

Sensor Agents
Sensor agents run on nodes hosting virtual machines. The sensor agents receive the
input message from a security module, format the alert message, and pass it to the Ingestor.
For example, the sensor agent for the common intrusion detection system, Snort, receives the
output from the Snort system, formats the message and appends metadata consisting of time
stamp, date stamp, node, and sensor id. The formatted message is then sent on to the Ingestor.

Ingestor
The Ingestor receives messages from sensor agents using the UDP protocol and has
the capability to buffer events. A throttling control is implemented to avoid back pressure
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from the Analyzer. The primary purpose of this component is to rapidly process event
messages and to perform flow control to prevent message loss.

Analyzer
The Analyzer performs the Summarize and Score step of our system. As sensor
events arrive from the Ingestor, the Analyzer inserts each message along with a count into a
persistent in memory data store. Messages and counts are summarized at the cloud and node
level. In addition, sensor ids for types and specific sensors are persisted with counts of
messages reported by the sensor.
The Analyzer uses message counts to calculate an urgency value from the number of
times the message has occurred historically in the cloud environment along with the number
of messages generated by the sensor as described earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, a decay
time is introduced to reduce the count of messages every n seconds. The reduction of
message counts ensures that future critical messages are not overlooked.

Detector
The Detector performs two roles. First, it detects anomalies in urgency scores using knearest neighbors over a sliding window. The first time a high score arrives, it is flagged as
an anomaly. As the same score continues to arrive, the anomaly score decreases, resulting in
in a reduction of messages passed to the classifier. Second, the Detector labels alerts as high,
medium, or low based upon the output from the Analyzer and standard deviations from the
mean of alerts.

Classifier
The Classifier provides step three of our approach, Classify Attacks. This component
uses Naive Bayes Classification to label the attack using concatenated sensor and alerts in 10
second data widows. As previously mentioned, The Classifier also provides a training mode
for adding new attack patterns.
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System Instantiation
We demonstrate our system in an IaaS cloud environment running Eucalyptus shown
in Figure 10. The environment consists of three nodes containing up to four virtual machines
each, a cloud controller machine, and two machines dedicated to the SCIMCS. This
configuration is similar to a small business private IaaS cloud environment.

Figure 10. Cloud Environment

Cloud Environment
Figure 10 provides a conceptual view of the experimentation environment. This
environment consists of five physical multicore systems connected over Gigabit Ethernet on a
private network. The cloud computing environment is made up of the cloud controller and
three node machines. The Streaming Cloud Intrusion Monitoring and Classification system is
distributed across two physical machines. The Cloud Controller contains the management
components for the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure (Nurmi et al., 2009). The nodes contain
security agents as well as the Eucalyptus node controller component for cloud management.
The SCIMCS consists of two physical systems which communicate with Agents on the nodes.
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SCIMCS Implementation
The SCIMCS implementation consists of the five components: Sensors, Ingestor,
Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier.

Sensors
Five sensors are deployed on each of the nodes in the IaaS environment: HCIDS,
Snort Sensor, Log Sensor, Network Sensor, and Rootkit Sensor. HCIDS is a hypervisor based
cloud intrusion detection system proposed in (Nikolai & Wang, 2014). It monitors virtual
machine performance metrics such as packets transmitted/received, block device read/write
requests, and CPU utilization then seeks out anomalies. A signature based categorization
approach is used to emit alerts, as described in chapter five.
The Snort sensor retrieves messages emitted from the Snort intrusion detection system
(Kumar, 2012). The Snort deployment is configured with all rules turned on. This
configuration ensures that valid attacks are not missed. It also demonstrates the dilemma
security administrators face with rule based systems. If too few rules are active, attacks are
missed. If too many rules are active, large volumes of messages are generated.
The log sensor retrieves node log messages from operating system logs. Log
messages can reveal abnormal system state and attacks. We monitor two logs: /var/log/secure
and /var/log/audit/audit.log. These logs provide operating system audit and security alerts.
The network sensor monitors network flow using a Python script to sniff traffic and
IBM Streams Anomaly Detection operator (Cancilla, 2015) to find anomalous patterns. Two
flow patterns are analyzed: the number of packets and packet rate. A 60 second training
window trains the anomaly detector and 30 second windows are used to detect anomalies.
When an anomaly is detected, an alert is generated.
Finally, the rootkit sensor runs a rootkit scan of the operating system which checks for
signatures of abnormal behavior on a node. If checks fail, an alert is generated with text from
the failed check. A modified version of the chkrootkit (Murilo & Steding-Jessen, n.d.) utility
is used.
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Ingestor
The Ingestor is written in the IBM programming language SPL and runs within the
IBM Streams (Ballard et al., 2010) distributed architecture. This architecture provides the
underlying high performance stream computing model and operators to throttle and buffer
alert event messages. In our implementation, we buffer up to 1,000 tuples and throttle the
flow rate to 20 tuples per second.

Analyzer
The Analyzer is coded in Python. Four dictionaries, which persist to disk upon
program shutdown, are used to store summary data about alerts. More specifically, messages
are stored along with counts by cloud, node, sensor, and sensor type. As described earlier in
this chapter, the summary data is used to dynamically calculate the weighted urgency score
based on message frequency. Labels of high, medium and low are given to alert messages
based on the number of standard deviations from the mean of urgency scores in the
environment.
Detector
The Detector is implemented using IBM InfoSphere Streams. The Streams Anomaly
Detector operator (Cancilla, 2015) is used to perform anomaly detection using 15 values with
a training data set of 30 tuples on the urgency scores generated by the Analyzer. When an
anomaly is detected, all of the messages that occurred during the anomalous time window are
passed to the Classifier.
Classifier
The Classifier is written in Python using the Reverend Python module for Bayesian
classification (Bakhtiar, 2009) and has two modes of operation: train and monitor. In train
mode, the administrator reproduces an attack. The anomalous event sensor ids and messages
are concatenated together for each alert message event during an attack in 10 second
windows. After attacks have been issued, the administrator applies a label defining the
pattern (e.g., [nmap], [dos], etc).
In monitor mode, the Classifier applies Bayesian classification to message patterns
using the classification data from train mode. When anomalous messages are detected by the
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Detector, they are passed to the Classifier where concatenation with sensor ids is performed
for each message in the 10 second window. Then, Bayesian classification is used to find the
closest match and display the type of attack. A threshold of .50 is applied for displaying
attack types based on empirical observation. Pattern matches with less than a .50 probability
match are not displayed. In addition to the labeled attack, the Classifier outputs anomalous
message alerts ranked as high, medium, or low based upon the score given by the Analyzer.
An example of output from the Classifier is shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Classifer Output

Demonstration and Evaluation
This section details system analysis, training, experimentation attacks, and results.
First, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our urgency score algorithm. Next, we detail our
experimentation approach. Finally, we discuss the results.

Urgency Score
The proposed approach utilizes urgency score for alert prioritization. To illustrate the
effectiveness of our posited urgency score, we run simulated event messages against the
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system. First, 11 distinct messages (i.e., m1, m2… m11) are simulated for a total of 2,047
messages. The messages are broadcast in powers of two after the first message is sent. In
other words, m1 is broadcast one time, m2 is sent two times, m3 is pushed four times and m11 is
passed to the analyzer 1,024 times. Each unique message is generated from a different sensor
on the same node.
The results are shown in Figure 12. The message urgency scores, UM, sensor urgency
scores, US, and overall urgency score, U, are plotted for message m11. Note that curve UM and
curve US result in the same value because the message event is broadcast from a single node
and sensor.
The first occurrence of message arrival is scored high and falls above three standard
deviations (3σ) from the mean of all message occurrences. As previously mentioned, scores
occurring beyond 1σ are considered potential threats, or black swan events. As illustrated, the
urgency score, U, decreases in importance over time as expected.

Figure 12. Urgency Score Simulation - One Node

To demonstrate the effectiveness of the overall urgency score using both the message
urgency score and sensor urgency score, the simulation continues on two additional nodes.
The scores for message m11 on node3 are plotted in Figure 13. The overall urgency score is
reduced in this instance when both message count and sensor count are taken into account. A
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black swan event message from a sensor never previously reporting the message ranks higher
than an event reported in the past.
The dynamic component of the scoring system assures rare events are properly scored.
In addition, our system prevents rare events from getting stale over time by incorporating a
decay factor which decrements each message count every n seconds of system operation. In
our experimentation, n is set to 600.

Figure 13. Urgency Score Simulation - Three Nodes

Streaming Intrusion Monitoring
Our system scores and analyzes streaming events from sensors by utilizing IBM
Streams which provides a scalable and high performing infrastructure along with analytical
support for anomaly detection. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our streaming system, we
examine the times from sensor generation to classification. A sample of 500 messages reveals
a minimum generation to classification time of less than one second, a maximum time of 20
seconds and a mean time of five seconds during our experimentation.
This sample suggests that an attacker would be detected within 20 seconds and if the
attack has been previously classified, the attack type would also be known. Counter actions
could be automatically initiated in a production system.
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Training the System
Two components of the system are trained: Analyzer and Classifier. This section
describes the training procedure.

Analyzer
The Analyzer self-trains over time as messages are generated by the sensors. High
volume alert messages and noisy sensors are given a lower urgency score. We complete this
training by running the system for one hour in normal operational state without attack.

Classifier
To train the Classifier, we run the component in training mode. Then, we conduct five
attacks: an nmap scan, a syn flood attack, an ssh password crack attack, malware insertion,
and we perform forensic counter measures by clearing logs. The detail for each attack is
provided in the next section. After an attack is run, an appropriate label is assigned to the
attack (e.g., [nmap], [synflood], etc.)
Experimentation Attacks
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we perform attacks on the test
environment using a four-step attack approach (Dell, 2012) to simulate a real attack. The four
steps consist of a reconnaissance phase, an intrusion and advanced attack phase, a malware
insertion phase, and a cleanup phase.
First, in the reconnaissance phase, an attacker attempts to learn about potential target
systems. In our experimentation, we use the nmap tool (Lyon, 2015) to scan systems in our
cloud environment. We pass the nmap tool parameters ’-T4 -A -v’ to conduct an intense scan.
The goal is to discover more information about vulnerable systems.
Second, the intrusion and advanced attack phase occurs after attackers find vulnerable
systems. For this phase of attack we perform a synflood using the hping tool (Sanfilippo,
2015) with the parameter ’–flood’ against port 80 and a ssh password attack using the ncrack
tool (Hantzis, 2015). The ncrack tool performs a dictionary attack against the root user on
multiple nodes.
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Third, in the malware insertion phase, malware is inserted into the environment to give
the attacker future access to the system. In our experimentation, we use the netcat tool
(Anonymous, 2007) to open a bindshell using the ’-L’ parameter.
And, fourth, in the cleanup phase, forensic evidence is removed from the system. We
clear two logs to remove traces that we logged into the system by clearing the files
/var/log/wtmp and /var/log/lastlog. These logs contain user login history to the system.
Results
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by examining our initial goals.
First, we show how our work reduces the volume of alarms without reducing the effectiveness
of security systems. Second, we demonstrate through experimentation the effectiveness of
using Bayesian classification for proper attack classification. Table 6 summarizes our
findings for message reduction results.
Table 6. Message Reduction Results

Attack

Number of
total alerts
generated
during attack
Reconnaissance:
4795
nmap
Intrusion and
4598
advanced attack
1: synflood
Intrusion and
3242
advanced attack
2: nCrack
Malware
4112
Insertion: bind
attack
Clean-up:
5050
Remove logs
No attack 1 (20
7468
minutes)
No attack 2 (20
7441
minutes)

Number of
alerts
determined to
be important
163

Number of
attack
messages not
reported
0

Percentage of
alert reduction

96.6%

561

0

87.8%

442

0

86.4%

50

0

98.5%

86

0

98.3%

88

n/a

98.8%

122

n/a

98.4%
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From Table 6, the results of our experimentation are promising. We observe an
average 95.9 percent message reduction. To verify that critical alerts were not missed, we
manually compare the generated alarm messages with those reported by the Classifier.
Table 7. Attack Classification Results

Attack

Number of
attacks

Number of
attacks
improperly
classified
0

Attack
classification
accuracy

10

Number of
attacks
properly
classified
10

Reconnaissance:
nmap
Intrusion and
advanced attack
1: synflood
Intrusion and
advanced attack
2: nCrack
Malware
Insertion: bind
attack
Clean-up:
Remove logs
No attack 1 (20
minutes)
No attack 2 (20
minutes)

10

10

0

100%

10

10

0

100%

10

10

0

100%

10

10

0

100%

54*

40*

14*

74.1%

58

58

0

100%

100%

Table 7 summarizes our classification findings. When not under attack, sensors
occasionally generate low volume messages which are displayed by the Classifier. To
address this issue, we trained the Classifier to flag these patterns are none threats. After the
attacks are trained in the system, we achieve a 100 percent accuracy in attack classification.
However, as previously discussed, when attack patterns have not been trained (labeled with a
* in the table), we observe a 25.9 percent misclassification rate in our environment. After
training the message patterns, the classification accuracy returns to 100 percent. Table 8
provides a summary of the sensors generating messages by type of attacks.

56

Table 8. Signatures

Attack

Sensor
HCIDS

Snort

Log Sensor

Sensor
Reconnaissance:
nmap
Intrusion and
advanced attack
1: synflood
Intrusion and
advanced attack
2: nCrack
Malware
Insertion: bind
attack
Clean-up:
Remove logs

Network

Rootkit

Sensor

Sensor

-

X

-

-

-

X

-

-

X

-

-

-

X

-

-

-

-

-

-

X

-

-

-

-

X

Other Observations
During our experimentation, a rogue log sensor was introduced into the environment.
This noisy sensor emitted several messages per second. The system classified the noise as a
potential synflood providing further supporting evidence for our approach.

Conclusion and Future Work
The multi-tenant, diverse nature of an IaaS cloud environment increases security
complexity. Lack of control over the data and applications running on tenant instances makes
securing these environments challenging for cloud providers. One approach recommended by
the Cloud Security Alliance is a defense in depth strategy where multiple layers of protection
provide a defense against bad actors. To implement this approach, multiple security
technologies are deployed. Monitoring these technologies and knowing which alerts to act
upon is non-trivial for cloud providers.
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Our work demonstrates that sensors which ingest output from these security
technologies can be used to feed a multistep approach that summarizes and scores alerts,
detects anomalies, and classifies attack patterns. First, our approach utilizes security
technology alert messages and sensor ids along with message and sensor volume data to score
the importance of a particular alert message. Next, time series analysis is applied using k
nearest neighbor anomaly detection over sliding windows of alert urgency scores. Finally, we
classify the anomalous alerts using Bayesian classification. In addition to classification, alerts
are output with a priority value of high, medium or low based upon how the alert score
deviates from the mean of alert scores for all historical alerts in the IaaS cloud environment.
We demonstrate our approach through implementation and experimentation. During
experimentation, we observe a total alert reduction of 95.9 percent with a zero percent miss
rate for attack messages. In addition, a 100 percent classification rate is demonstrated for
previously trained attacks. We suggest five areas for future research. First, more attack
experimentation is needed to determine the effectiveness of Bayesian classification as well as
other machine learning techniques. Second, we recommend introducing more sensors in the
environment. As the number of sensors increase, the effectiveness of our classification
approach should improve. We hypothesize that the use of more sensors which can detect
specific attacks will improve our Bayesian classification technique as well as other similar
techniques. Third, we encourage scaling the approach to a large IaaS cloud environment.
Our test bed is a small cloud environment, similar to a small business. At this time, we can
only extrapolate our results to larger cloud environments. Fourth, we suggest a technique of
multilayer classification using our technique in this chapter. In other words, we hypothesize
using multiple layers of classification could allow for detection of attack phases.
Longitudinal analysis of detected attacks could reveal patterns relating to how far the bad
actor has progressed in an attack. And, fifth, we encourage research in applying other
machine learning, anomaly detection, and classification techniques.
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CHAPTER 7
A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING MALICIOUS INSIDER
DATA THEFT
On August 25, 2006, Amazon EC2, one of the leading Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) cloud offerings, went into beta (Barr, 2006). Since then, cloud computing has become
big business. The largest technology companies in the world now provide cloud computing
offerings and solutions (Google, 2015; IBM, 2015; Microsoft, 2015). However, cloud
computing is not without challenges. According to the Cloud Security Alliance (Cloud
Security Alliance, 2013), data theft and insider attacks are two of the nine critical threats
facing cloud security.
Insider attacks fall into three categories: malicious, accidental, and non-malicious
(Willis-Ford, 2015). Malicious insiders conduct activities such as ip theft, information
technology sabotage, fraud, and espionage, with intent of doing harm or for personal gain.
Accidental insider attacks occur when unintentional misuse of systems is performed by a user
without the intent of harm. And, non-malicious insider attacks are intentional attacks where
the user attempts to perform self-benefiting activities but without malicious intent.
Technical controls exist for reducing the risk of insider attacks, including intrusion
detection systems, security information and event management, data loss prevention, access
control systems, and honey-tokens. In addition, non-technical controls are used and consist of
psychology prediction models, education and awareness, as well as information security
policies (Elmrabit, Yang, & Yang, 2015). While controls exist, not all insider attacks can be
detected. Furthermore, several approaches for addressing insider attacks are reactive and not
predictive in nature. Techniques for preventing such attacks are needed (Maxim, 2011).
Although no single approach can prevent all insider threats, a multi-faceted proactive
technique can be used to reduce the risk of damage caused by inside attackers (Maxim, 2011).
Several types of attacks exist, including unauthorized extraction of data, data tampering, asset
destruction, illegal downloading, eavesdropping, spoofing, social engineering, resource
misuse, and installing of malicious software (M. Ben Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo, 2008).
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Our work puts forth a new security control for detecting one type of insider attack,
unauthorized extraction of data, or data theft. The importance of reducing the risk of data
theft gained recent international attention when the National Security Agency contractor,
Edward Snowden, downloaded and disseminated classified documents about intelligence
programs (Elmrabit et al., 2015). A system to detect and possibly thwart such actions has
significant potential to contribute to a successful defense in depth (SANS, 2001) security
strategy and reduce the damage of data theft from inside attackers.
We posit a system profiling approach for detecting abnormal login activity and data
transfers from IaaS cloud computing nodes hosting tenant virtual machines. This approach
aims to address the problem of rogue administrators as described in Claycomb and Nicoll
(Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012) who attempt to steal data from nodes as discussed in Duncan,
Creese and Goldsmith (Duncan, Creese, & Goldsmith, 2012). Our approach uses k-nearest
neighbors anomaly detection to detect abnormal variations in bytes sent over the network and
number of active users on the cloud node. Furthermore, we examine system state data
consisting of open files and network connections to improve detection and provide forensic
data for investigation.
Unauthorized extraction attacks are especially important to address in IaaS cloud
environments to prevent theft of tenant virtual machine data. Although encryption may
reduce risk of insiders having the ability to use stolen data, encrypted virtual machine images
and data store files may be copied from nodes and attacked off line.
In our system, agents are installed on cloud nodes hosting virtual machines and data.
The system is trained under normal cloud operating conditions. Then, the system monitors
for anomalies in transmitted network data and active user logins using k-nearest neighbors
anomaly detection. This data is used to detect anomalies that exceed normal operating
thresholds established during training.
Our results suggest that using k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection to monitor node
network transmissions and number of active users along with system state information can be
used to detect 100 percent of abnormal login activity and data copies to outside systems by
users. Furthermore, we observe a zero false positive detection rate when anomalies in active
user counts and bytes transmitted are detected along with supporting system state data.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, related work is discussed.
Second, the design of our system for detecting malicious insider data theft presented. Third,
the system is demonstrated and results are discussed. Fourth, our work is summarized and we
discuss future works.

Related Work
A number of works have been posited to reduce the threat of insider attacks. Stolfo,
Salm, and Keromytis posit an approach to mitigate attacks using fog computing where they
detect abnormal usage patterns and present potential attackers with misinformation (Stolfo,
Salem, & Keromytis, 2012). Claycomb and Nicoll discuss the threat of rogue administrators
and suggest process based approaches to deal with the threat. Furthermore, they discuss
future research topics which include predictive models (Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012). Colombe
and Stephens suggest an approach to visualize intrusion detection system data to detect insider
attacks (Colombe & Stephens, 2004). Babu and Bhanu research an approach for using key
stroke dynamics to detect insiders (Bondada & Bhanu, 2014). A more related and interesting
technique for detecting insider attacks is the use of machine learning and rule based detection
posited by Khorshed and Wasimi (Khorshed, Ali, & Wasimi, 2011). They suggest that rule
based learning can be used to detect insider attacks in a cloud environment and that
continuous cloud monitoring is an important part of cloud security. Sriram, Patel, and
Lakshmanan posit a hybrid protocol using selective encryption and data cleaning along with
user profiling and decoy technology to address the problem of inside attackers. One aspect of
their work related to our approach is the use of a neural network that examines volume of data
downloaded, nature of the operations, division of the task, ip address, and log files (Sriram,
Patel, Harishma, & Lakshmanan, 2014). In previous work, we have put forth a system for
detecting attacks from and against virtual machines in an IaaS cloud environment using
anomalies in performance metrics obtained from the hypervisor (Nikolai & Wang, 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, applying the approach described in this chapter is novel.
While insider attack detection and prevention is an active research area, we are unable to find
existent works specifically targeting the problem of insider data theft using anomaly
detection, system metrics, and system state information. Furthermore, we demonstrate our
work through instantiation and experimentation with promising results.
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Design and Development
An IaaS cloud environment typically consists of virtual machines hosted on physical
nodes which run node controller agents. A single node may host virtual machine instances of
different tenants. Each tenant may run various applications and workloads. In addition,
virtual machines are dynamic and may be created and destroyed by tenant requests at any time
resulting in an ever changing environment. Our work posits an approach to detect data theft
within an IaaS cloud environment. More specifically, we seek to detect rogue administrators
following the flow in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Insider Data Theft Flow Chart

Most production deployment policies restrict administrator login to systems. Our
approach supports these controls by logging unusual login events. In addition, knowledgeable
attackers are aware of forensic countermeasures. Hence, all of our detection and analysis
must be performed on near real time data and persisted to a remote system.
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The specific pattern that our system detects is shown in Figure 14 and consists of three
steps: attacker logs in node, attacker copies data to outside system, and attacker logs out from
node. Each event is considered an attack anomaly. In our approach, we examine the anomaly
value for the number of active users and amount of data sent from the node. This approach
allows the system to adapt to various environments and adjust to normal fluctuations that can
occur in the environment. Furthermore, we examine system state forensic data for open
connections and open files. In order for data theft to occur, an external connection must exist
and a data file open for reading.

Approach
Our approach for detecting insider data theft uses a three step technique illustrated in
Figure 15. First, the system is trained. Then, the system is put into monitoring mode. And,
finally, a state-based rules approach is used to detect signatures of insider data theft.

Figure 15. Insider Data Theft Detection Approach

Train
A goal of training mode is to not burden security operations with excessive tuning in
order to achieve accurate results. A system with a complicated training requirement lacks
scalability. To achieve this goal, the system is placed into training mode while normal IaaS
cloud activities occur. Our assumption is that attacks are not occurring during this period.
Restricted access and additional manual monitoring may be applied during this period to
reduce the likelihood of an attack.
Virtual machines are created and terminated. Tenants run various workloads. Data is
sent from an agent on each cloud node hosting virtual machines to our system. During this
time, we examine two system metrics for detecting insider attacks: number of active users on
nodes and number of tcp bytes transmitted to the network from these nodes. Maximum k-
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nearest neighbors anomaly scores derived using the IBM InfoSphere Streams anomaly
detection operator (Cancilla, 2015) are calculated to be used later in monitoring mode.
Values arrive separately for each metric every second and are stored in memory. The
first 20 values create the reference pattern. A current pattern of 10 values is compared to a
subsequence of the reference pattern calculating an anomaly score. A total score is computed
from the subsequence comparison scores. As each value arrives, a score is computed, and the
window slides to the left. As anomalous events occur, the score increases. This total score is
the anomaly value used by our system.
The pattern sizes of 20 and 10 are derived through empirical analysis with a goal of
accuracy and performance in mind. Tuning these values is beyond the scope of this work and
is considered as future work. In addition, although thr number of active users and bytes sent
over the network are the two metrics used for insider data theft detection, we collect metric
anomaly data on user space, cpu usage, virtual memory, network connections, input/output
read bytes, input/output write bytes, network bytes received, network bytes sent, number of
users logged into node, and number of processes. In future work, we plan to investigate
machine learning techniques with the goal of deriving more complex insider attack signatures.

Monitor
The system is placed into monitor mode with no attack assumptions. Similar to
training mode, system metric data is sent from agents on cloud nodes to our system. Virtual
machines are created, terminated, and tenant workloads run. Anomaly scores are calculated
as previously done in training mode. However, instead of calculating maximum anomalous
scores for each system metric, the calculated values are compared to the maximum values
derived during the training period. Values that do not exceed the maximum scores are filtered
from the system and ignored.
The plot in Figure 16 illustrates sample anomaly values for network transmission.
Figure 17 shows the anomaly values compared to the trained reference pattern.
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Figure 16. Network txbytes Anomaly Scores under Normal Conditions

Figure 17. Network txbytes Anomaly Scores Normal Conditions with Trained Max

From Figure 17, one can observe that the trained maximum anomaly score is greater
than the current tcp bytes transmitted anomaly score. Hence, anomalous activity is not
detected.
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Detect
Detection of insider data theft involves three events: a login anomaly (E1), a data
transfer anomaly (E2), and forensic evidence (E3) as shown in Figure 18. When all three
events are present (A3), we observe a 100 percent detection rate with a zero percent false
positive rate. In this case, a login anomaly (E1) is detected followed by an abnormal data
transfer (E2). And, forensic evidence (E3) is detected for both a network connection to the
node and open files being copied. The forensic evidence is collected by the agent and is
analyzed after E1 and E2 anomaly events occur.

Figure 18. Detection of Insider Data Theft Venn Diagram

During experimentation, we examine condition A1 and A2 in isolation to determine
whether a single event can be used for detection. We produce false positives for condition A2
by performing denial of service attacks between virtual machines hosted on nodes in the
environment. In the case where E1 is present, a false positive is generated. This is considered
a false positive because a denial of service attack is not a data theft scenario. To simulate A1,
we turn off forensic evidence detection to examine the false positive and negative rates. We
find that using both E1 and E2 as a vehicle to detect insider attacks is mostly successful.
However, instances such as Denial of Service attacks or massive data transfers from virtual
machines hosted on nodes can result in false positives and false negatives.
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Figure 19 illustrates one sample from our experimentation for event E2.

Figure 19. Network txbytes Anomaly

Figure 20 shows a sample from our experimentation for event E1.

Figure 20. Active User Anomaly
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Both Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate significant anomaly scores above the trained
maximum for network transmitted bytes and active user logins. The detection of all three
conditions is required to eliminate false positives.

System Instantiation
We demonstrate our system in an IaaS cloud environment running the Eucalyptus
cloud infrastructure shown in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Cloud Environment

Cloud Environment
Figure 21 provides a conceptual view of the experimentation environment. The
Eucalyptus cloud framework is used because of its similarities to the popular Amazon cloud
infrastructure. IBM Streams provides a scalable infrastructure with built in analytical
functions. Furthermore, both technologies are available free of charge for research purposes.
The physical environment consists of five multi-core systems connected over Gigabit
Ethernet on a private network. The Cloud Controller contains the management components
for the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure (Nurmi et al., 2009). The Nodes contain Eucalyptus
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node controllers and our agent written in Python to gather system metrics. The Insider Data
Theft Detector runs IBM Streams and our system implementation code.

Insider Data Theft Detection System Implementation
Our system implementation consists of two components, agents that gather system
metrics from cloud nodes and a detector which analyzes the data.

Agents
The Agent component is written in Python and runs on every node hosting virtual
machines. It uses the psutil package along with calls to netstat to gather, format, and send
data to the detector using a UDP socket connection. The output includes system metrics as
described earlier and open connections as well as file state data.

Detector
The Detector is written in two programming languages: Python and Streams
Processing Language (SPL). The Python script has two modes of operations, training and
monitoring. Similarly, two SPL programs are used for training and monitoring.
In training mode, the Python script ingests metric data from agents and sends it to the
SPL program. The anomaly detector operator is used to calculate an anomaly score and
maximum training data is persisted in a JSON formatted file.
In monitoring mode, the Python script loads the JSON file into memory and enriches
agent data with maximum anomaly values established during training. The SPL program
ingests the data from the Python script and calculates the anomaly score similar to training
mode. However, instead of saving scores to a file, anomaly values are compared in real time
with the maximum values established during training. Values that exceed the maximum
anomaly value for a given metric are passed to an alert script written in Python. System state
data is persisted to a file as it arrives from each agent and acts as a forensic trail.
The alert Python script listens for abnormal login events and data transfer events.
When an event is detected, the forensic data associated with the event is retrieved from the
data file. If forensic data related to open connections and files is retrieved from the data file
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for the event, an alert is logged indicating that a data theft attack occurred. Login events are
always logged.

Demonstration and Evaluation
This section details training the system, data theft attacks executed, attack messages
reported, and summarizes our results.

Training the System
Training of the system occurred over a one hour period of time. To test the
effectiveness of our approach, we refrain from applying tenant virtual machine workloads
during the training period. Instead, we train the system by launching and terminating several
different virtual machines. We create up to 12 medium and small virtual machines with
Centos 6, Centos 7 and Ubuntu precise images. After the virtual machines become accessible,
they are terminated. This approach creates a baseline of activity for the Eucalyptus
environment without attempting to predict the workload of users. Furthermore, this meets the
goal for a practical and simplistic training approach.

Normal Operating Conditions
Under normal operating conditions, tenant virtual machines are randomly created and
terminated placing the cloud environment into various states consisting of starting, stopping,
and running virtual machines under load and in idle state. Furthermore, at times, tenant
virtual machines place excessive network traffic load on 50 percent of the virtual machines
transferring data to and from nodes. Load is placed on the virtual machine using system
updates and web data transfers.

Data Theft Attacks
The goal of our experimentation is to demonstrate the effectiveness for using our
system to detect data theft of tenant data on IaaS cloud nodes and virtual machines. We use
copies of actual virtual machine data which is approximately five gigabytes in size. In
addition, we test the system with smaller data theft events, including the theft of data files 500
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megabytes and 100 megabytes in size. Various data sizes provide supporting evidence for the
effectiveness of the system.

Attack Messages Reported
We conduct 48 attacks during our experimentation. An attack is considered an
unapproved login or data transfer event. Of these attacks, 48 are detected and reported. A
sample of the system output is shown below in the following format: [node reporting],[date
reported],[time reported], [alert message], [forensic data]. The forensic data is reduced
because of space constraints.
...”node1.cloud.res”,”2016-03-12”,”14:09:42”,”[INSIDER] [Node: node1.cloud.res]
[Attack Detected: Abnormal user login activity detected] ”, ”@sconn(...laddr=( 192.168.1.98
22) raddr=( 192.168.1.110 52925)...”
”node1.cloud.res”,”2016-03-12”,”14:13:49”,”[INSIDER] [Node: node1.cloud.res]
[Attack Detected: Abnormally large data transfer detected] ”,”...popenfile(path=
/root/theft1...”

From the sample data above, one can observe that the forensic data reveals the IP
address of the attacker and file being copied along with supporting evidence to assist with an
investigation.

Results
The goal of our work is to detect insider data theft in IaaS cloud environments. Our
approach uses three events, login anomalies, data transfer anomalies, and forensic data to
detect attacks. During experimentation, we perform attacks using all three events for attack
detection and observe a 100 percent detection rate in under 60 seconds with zero false
positives for 48 attacks contained in 233,829 data sets sent by node agents. The results are
shown in Table 9.
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Table 9. Experimentation Results

IaaS State

VM Workload

Type of Attack

No VMs
running
No VMs
running
10 VMs starting
10 VMs starting

None

Login

None
None
None

10 VMs running None
10 VMs running None
10 VMs
None
stopping
10 VMs
None
stopping
10 VMs running Five VM
workload
10 VMs running Five VM
workload
10 VMs
Five VM
stopping
workload
10 VMs
Five VM
stopping
workload
10 VMs running Five VM
workload
10 VMs running Five VM
workload
10 VMs running Five VM
workload
10 VMs running Five VM
workload

Number of
Attacks
3

Percent
Detected
100%

Five GB data
theft
Login
Five GB data
theft
Login
Five GB data
theft
Login

3

100%

3
3

100%
100%

3
3

100%
100%

3

100%

Five GB data
theft
Login

3

100%

3

100%

Five GB data
theft
Login

3

100%

3

100%

Five GB data
theft
Login

3

100%

3

100%

500 MB data
theft
Login

3

100%

3

100%

100 MB data
theft

3

100%

We also examine each event in isolation and find flaws in the use of single events:

Login Events (E1) Only
Examining login events in isolation using our approach detects 100 percent of
anomalous user login and logout activity. However, this cannot be used to detect insider data
theft.
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Data Transfer Anomaly Events (E2) Only
Data transfer anomalies can be solely used to detect data theft events. However, we
observe an unacceptably high 22.6 percent false positive rate under extreme operating
conditions. These extremes occur during excessive starting and stopping of all virtual
machines in the cloud environment and under heavy cloud tenant data transfer workload.
Furthermore, when performing denial of service attacks between tenant nodes, we observe a
100 percent false positive rate using these events in isolation.

Forensic Data (E3) Only
System state data for open connections and open files also can be used to detect both
abnormal login activity and data theft attacks. However, this approach is unreliable. During
our experimentation, we observe normal connection activity between the node controller and
the cloud controller. While rules could be created to filter out known connections, the
complexity of creating rules and filters would complicate the system and not meet our
requirement for usability and ease of use.

Conclusion and Future Work
We put forth a train, monitor, detect pattern for detecting insider data theft attacks.
Our system profiling approach utilizes a combination of system metric anomalies and system
state data. More specifically, we use a k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection algorithm to
score the number of active users on nodes and bytes sent over the network. Excessive scores
compared to scores calculated during training indicate an attack event. In addition, system
state data on open connections and files is collected and analyzed. Our experimentation
suggests that the combination of login events, data transfer events and system state events
results in a 100 percent detection rate for insider data theft attacks with a zero percent false
positive rate.
To expand on our work, three areas should be explored. First, scalability of the
approach needs to be tested in a large IaaS cloud environment. Second, various anomaly
detection approaches should be explored. And, third, leveraging machine learning techniques
to find rules may reveal combinations of system metrics for better detection of insider attacks.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we set out to explore security and privacy concerns in IaaS cloud
computing environments. More specially, our research focuses on the instantiation of new
security control artifacts that make up a system of novel security controls to reduce the risk of
deploying in these multi-tenant and dynamic environments. We set out to explore three
research questions. First, how can we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without
specific knowledge of tenant applications in order to preserve privacy? Second, how can we
assist cloud providers with interpretation of the output from security controls in an IaaS cloud
environment to improve security? And, third, how can we help protect cloud tenants from
insider data theft attacks?
Based on the research questions, we aim to achieve three research objectives through
the instantiation of new security control artifacts making up an overall system. The first
objective is achieved through the instantiation of a new system for detecting abnormal usage
in virtual machines using system performance metrics obtained by the hypervisor, or our
Hypervisor-based Cloud Intrusion Detection System. In this work, we demonstrate and
publish our work which lays the ground work for using performance signatures from
hypervisors and rule based attack classification to detect and halt attacks from and against
virtual machine instances in cloud environments without knowing the precise workload
running on the virtual machine. Instantiation and demonstration of the system reveals a 100
percent detection rate for denial of service attacks from and against the virtual machine.
The second objective is accomplished through the instantiation of a new approach and
system for reducing the vast numbers of alarms that can occur from a defense in depth
approach with many sensors in the cloud environment. We derive a three step approach
consisting of summarize and score, detect anomalies, and classify attacks. Construction and
demonstration of this system reveals that we are able to reduce the alarm volume by 95.9
percent. In addition, when properly trained, this approach has a 100 percent classification rate
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using Bayesian classification. This work lays the ground work for future research on alert
reduction and attack classification from multiple security sensors in cloud environments.
The third objective set forth in our research is the detection of insider data theft
attacks. We develop and instantiate a system which detects the transfer of files from cloud
nodes which can be used to detect the theft of virtual machines and data stores by examining
system state along with anomalies in bytes transmitted and number of active users on the
system. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach with a 100 percent detection rate
of simulated data thefts in a cloud environment. Our research lays the ground work for
further research in node system usage metrics and system state from the granular detection of
insider attacks.
We accomplished the goals that we set out to achieve of examining the three research
questions with an objective to create an artifact for each question. Furthermore, our work is
or will soon be published in the proceedings from three flagship IEEE conferences (Nikolai &
Wang, 2014, 2016a, 2016b) which further validates our work, demonstrates the relevance of
our research, and contributes back to the knowledge base. Although we are successful in our
research, we merely lay the ground work for additional exploration and research. Much work
is still needed to explore the scalability of our approaches and system. Each artifact must be
demonstrated in large scale cloud environments to ensure the effectiveness of the solution.
Also, new anomaly detection approaches should be researched to determine optimal
techniques for each component. Machine learning and advanced rules engines should also be
considered in future research.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: HCIDS SYSTEM DESIGN
System Design

Figure 22. Hypervisor-Based Cloud Intrusion Detection System Design

Snode.py
This program retrieves system metric data every second from the hypervisor and passes it to
CHIDS.spl for analysis.

CHIDS.spl
This program looks for abnormal spikes in metric data and then compares to known attack
patterns. Then, it sends the attack information to the SCIMCS system.
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APPENDIX B: SCIMCS SYSTEM DESIGN
System Design

Figure 23. Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification System Design

Launch.sh
This script was used for starting the sensors during experimentation.

Snortsensor.py
This program retrieves data from the popular Snort intrusion detection system, formats it, and
passes it the MSIDS.spl.

checkrootkit.py
This program uses the chkrootkit package to search for known rootkits. It formats the output
and passes any results to MSIDS.spl.
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Logsensor.py
This program retrieves and formats data from log files. Then, it sends the data to MSIDS.spl.

Tcpipsensor.py
This code was originally written by someone going under the handle Silver Moon. It was
modified to sniff tcp/ip traffic, format it and send the data to tcpanomalyfinder.spl.

MSIDS.spl
This program ingests data from sensors, buffers the data, and controls the flow rate into
analyzer.py.

Tcpanomalyfinder.spl
This program ingests sniffed formatted data from tcpipsensor.py and looks for anomalies in
the rate at which packets are sent and the size. Then, abnormal activity is labeled using rules
based on observation. The output is sent to MSIDS.spl.

Analyzer.py
This program does the counting, weighting, and persistence of alerts. It can be considered the
brain of the system. The major calculations are done here. As alerts come into the program,
they are given a value and passed to detector.spl.

Detector.spl
This program looks for anomalies in alert message scores from analyzer. This performs a
filtration effect to stop overwhelming administrators with redundant alerts. In addition, alerts
are ranked high, medium, or low and passed to classifer.py
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Classifer.py
This program has two modes: training and monitor. In training mode, it takes groups of
alerts and stores. A label can be assigned. In monitor mode, the program looks for groups of
messages that match previously observed patterns using Bayes classification. The alert data is
sent off to be rendered on a web page.

visualize.html
This html script utilizes Google visualization APIs to visualize the output from classifer.py.

Get_data.cgi
This script feeds data to the visualize.html page for visualizing the output from classifer.py.
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APPENDIX C: A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING INSIDER DATA
THEFT DESIGN
System Design

Figure 24. Insider Data Theft Detector System Design

Insider.py
This program gathers the data from the nodes and performs the agent role in the research.

insider_scoring.py
This program has two modes: training and monitoring. In training mode, data is sent to
InsiderThreatDetectorTrainer.spl where normal patterns are learned. In monitoring mode,
data is enriched from the training data and is sent to InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl where
abnormal usage is detected.
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InsiderThreatDetectorTrainer.spl
This program calculates anomaly values for each metric passed in and then writes to data
files.

Parse_training_data.py
This program reads data files and generates insiderdata.json with the max values observed
during the training period.

InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl
This program takes in metric data, calculates an anomaly score and compares the score to the
maximum score observed during training.

insider_detection.py
This program ingests the anomaly data from InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl and issues the
alerts.

